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I. INTRODUCTION 
Even as a twelve year old, DW1 was familiar with juvenile court.  
Ramsey County had recently terminated his mother’s parental 
rights, and although DW lived in St. Paul, the county social services 
placed him in foster care in Minneapolis.  Separated from his 
mother and living with strangers, DW soon found himself in the 
juvenile delinquency system. 
On March 21, 2002, school officials called the police and had 
DW arrested.  According to the police report, a school secretary 
walked in on DW “going through some papers” in her office.  She 
told him to leave.  DW said he needed to use the phone, but she 
refused.  DW “grabbed [her] by the shoulders and shoved her into 
the door.  [She] struck her hand on the edge of the door and cut 
her finger.”  Police detained DW at the Hennepin County Juvenile 
Detention Facility.2 
Hennepin County filed a delinquency petition charging 
fourth-degree assault.3  At his hearing,4 DW waived his right to have 
a parent present,5 waived his trial rights, “admitted” the assault, and 
 
 1. DW is a real person who was involved in real cases.  All identifying 
information has been intentionally left out of this article.  The facts come from 
available records, but juvenile court hearings are private and the transcripts were 
not introduced in the adult trial.  See MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 30.02. 
 2. See generally id. R. 5.02 (defining the power to detain juveniles). 
 3. Minnesota law makes assault of certain persons a more serious offense, 
including school personnel: “Whoever assaults a school official while the official is 
engaged in the performance of the official’s duties, and inflicts demonstrable 
bodily harm, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.  As used in this subdivision, ‘school 
official’ includes teachers, school administrators, and other employees of a public 
or private school.”  MINN. STAT. § 609.2231, subdiv. 5 (2008).  While a 
misdemeanor may be punished with up to nintey days in jail, a gross misdemeanor 
may include up to a year in jail.  Id. § 609.03. 
 4. This is called a detention hearing.  Under Minnesota law, detained 
juveniles must be brought before a judge or referee within thirty-six hours of 
being taken into custody.  MINN. STAT. § 260B.176, subdiv. 2.   
 5. Minnesota law requires a parent to attend most juvenile court hearings.  
2
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established a factual basis for the offense.  The county reduced the 
charge to simple assault6 in exchange for the admission.  The judge 
accepted the waivers and admission, but did not make any 
findings.7  She transferred venue to Ramsey County for disposition, 
where DW had a pending case.  The judge detained DW until that 
hearing. 
DW appeared in Ramsey County on April 8, 2002, after having 
been held in custody for eighteen days.  Once again, no relative 
appeared at the hearing.  DW’s Ramsey County attorney alerted the 
court that the parental rights of DW’s mother were recently 
terminated and asked that a guardian ad litem be ordered to 
protect DW’s interests.8  The judge ordered a guardian ad litem to 
represent DW at “all further proceedings.”9  Despite this order, no 
 
Id. § 260B.163, subdiv. 7.  In fact the statute gives the juvenile court authority to 
issue arrest warrants for parents who fail to appear.  See id. § 260B.154.  The statute 
also provides parents significant rights to participate in all hearings.  They are 
“entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to the case, and to cross-
examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.”  Id. § 260B.163, subdiv. 9.  The court 
may not waive a child’s right to parental presence in a juvenile delinquency 
hearing, and may only permit the child to waive presence with “an express waiver 
voluntarily and intelligently made by the child after the child has been fully and 
effectively informed of the right being waived.”  Id. subdiv. 10. 
 6. See MINN. STAT. § 609.224, subdiv. 1 (categorizing charges of fifth-degree 
assault). 
 7. The juvenile court rules require written findings within seven days of a 
hearing.  MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 13.09.  Without written findings, it is very difficult to 
recreate what happened at a hearing or review judicial reasoning at subsequent 
hearings.  In DW’s case, the authors had to try to track down transcripts of the 
hearings to determine whether his rights had been vindicated. 
 8. Minnesota law provides for guardians in delinquency cases.  MINN. STAT. § 
260B.163, subdiv. 6.  A guardian has obligations to the child to remain 
independent of the court and court personnel.  Id. 
 9. Cf. O'Neil v. Swan, 299 Minn. 206, 207, 218 N.W.2d 457, 457 (1974) 
(“[T]he purpose of a guardianship ad litem . . . is to protect the rights of the 
infant.”); In re Welfare of J.S., 470 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (“The 
guardian ad litem has the duty to act within the judicial proceedings to further the 
best interests of the child, and to do so the guardian ad litem must be free ‘to 
engage in vigorous and autonomous representation of the child.’” (quoting 
Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1988))).  Minnesota law 
outlines the guardian’s duties as: 
(b) A guardian ad litem shall carry out the following responsibilities: 
(1) conduct an independent investigation to determine the facts 
relevant to the situation of the child and the family, which must 
include, unless specifically excluded by the court, reviewing relevant 
documents; meeting with and observing the child in the home 
setting and considering the child’s wishes, as appropriate; and 
interviewing parents, caregivers, and others with knowledge relevant 
to the case; 
3
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guardian ad litem appeared at any subsequent hearings.  
The judge adjudicated DW delinquent.  The transcript 
referenced two files with different dates and case numbers.  
However, the order stated only that “[t]he child is adjudicated 
delinquent” without referencing to which petitions the order 
applied.10  The judge released DW to a group home. 
DW continued to have trouble adjusting to his new life, and 
soon found himself back in detention.  On July 31, 2002, DW, still 
twelve, punched a seventeen-year-old boy living in his group home.  
After being held in detention for thirty days, DW appeared in 
Ramsey County Juvenile Court on a petition charging assault in the 
fifth-degree.11  Neither a relative nor the appointed guardian 
appeared with DW.  He waived his rights and admitted the petition.  
The judge continued the case for disposition.  At the disposition 
hearing, DW once again appeared without a relative or the 
guardian ad litem.  The court continued DW on probation12 and 
ordered him back to the group home.  He was never adjudicated 
 
(2) advocate for the child’s best interests by participating in 
appropriate aspects of the case and advocating for appropriate 
community services when necessary; 
(3) maintain the confidentiality of information related to a case, 
with the exception of sharing information as permitted by law to 
promote cooperative solutions that are in the best interests of the 
child; 
(4) monitor the child’s best interests throughout the judicial 
proceeding; and 
(5) present written reports on the child’s best interests that include 
conclusions and recommendations and the facts upon which they 
are based. 
(c) The court may waive the appointment of a guardian ad litem 
pursuant to paragraph (a), whenever counsel has been appointed 
pursuant to subdivision 2 or is retained otherwise, and the court is satisfied 
that the interests of the minor are protected. 
MINN. STAT. § 260B.163, subdiv. 6(b)–(c) (emphases added). 
 10. At the hearing, the judge ordered: 
DW, I’m going to follow the recommendations of probation.  I’m going 
to order that you be placed in the [name withheld] group home for a 
period of nine to twelve months, that you attend outpatient sexual-
offender treatment as directed by probation, that you attend your 
psychiatric appointments and follow the medication orders, that you 
perform 24 hours of community work service, and that you make 
restitution.  I am going to—you will be adjudicated for this offense at this 
time given the nature of the offenses. 
 11. See MINN. STAT. § 609.224 (defining fifth-degree assault). 
 12. The juvenile court rules do not require a court to enter an adjudication 
of delinquency, but provide options including a continuance without any 
adjudication for various amounts of time.  MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05, subdiv. 4. 
4
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delinquent on this petition. 
On November 3, 2003, Ramsey County filed a new petition 
against DW, then thirteen, alleging assault in the fourth-degree.  
The petition averred that DW “got angry with the [school] 
principal when he intervened in a dispute with another student . . . 
[so DW] pushed and swung at him.”  Although there was no 
guardian ad litem present, DW’s grandfather appeared with him at 
this hearing.  In exchange for an amended charge of assault in the 
fifth-degree (simple assault) and dismissal of the other counts,13 
DW admitted the offense.  The judge adjudicated DW delinquent 
and placed him at a Department of Corrections residential facility14 
for twenty-one days. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13. Also included in the petition were charges of possession of a small 
amount of marijuana and disorderly conduct.  
 14. The Department of Court Services committed DW to the Minnesota 
Correctional Facility (“MCF-Togo”).  According to the facility website: 
Togo . . . is available for use on a per diem basis by all Minnesota juvenile 
county courts and provides court and social service agencies with an 
alternative residential program.  Average daily population is about 41.   
The MCF-Togo offers a three-week program, operated separately for boys 
and girls between 13 and 17 years of age.  It also offers a three-month 
program for boys.  Each program is intended to serve as a treatment 
resource for juveniles who have experienced failure in the home, school 
and community. 
MCF-Togo Facility Information, MINN. DEP’T OF CORRS.,  http://www.doc.state.mn.us
/facilities/togo.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).  The twenty-one day program is 
described as follows: 
Thistledew Wilderness Endeavors is a year-round, 21-day adventure 
therapy program for boys or girls (the girls’ program operates separately 
from the boys program and has a strong gender-specific focus).  It 
provides students with a safe but challenging environment in which to 
discover and develop tools for change and personal growth.  Wilderness 
activities such as backpacking, canoeing, and cross-country skiing are 
used, along with rock climbing and a teams course.  Participants also 
have a four-day solo experience, which includes cognitive skills, finalizing 
goals and personal reflection.  A therapy component helps residents 
process their experiences and transfer them to real-life situations.  
Students receive one-half year of school credit in English, one-half year 
credit in science, and also one full year in physical education. 
Id. 
5
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Finally, on July 23, 2009, Minneapolis police arrested DW, then 
nineteen, for “domestic assault.”15  Hennepin County charged the 
domestic as a felony, enhanced by the three juvenile 
“adjudications” which had occurred during a sixteen month 
period, beginning seven years earlier.  
This article examines an emerging issue in the use of juvenile 
adjudications as an element in the enhancement of offenses.16  It 
seems inherently unfair to change a misdemeanor to a felony based 
on juvenile adjudications when the defendant was only twelve or 
thirteen.  In preparing DW’s defense, we found serious flaws in the 
juvenile adjudications used to enhance the charge.  The record 
raised doubt about the legality of the adjudications, as to both the 
fact of conviction and the reliability of the procedures.  There is a 
fundamental difference between using recidivism to lengthen 
felony sentences and using recidivism to enhance the charge itself.  
The difference amounts to a violation of due process protections. 
The first part of this article briefly discusses the history of 
juvenile court development and the trends in legislation which led 
to enhancement by prior adjudication.  The second part of this 
article relates the litigation in DW’s case and attacks the 
enhancement portion of the charge in the pretrial probable cause 
 
 15. Minnesota’s domestic assault statute provides:  
Whoever does any of the following against a family or household member 
. . . commits an assault and is guilty of a misdemeanor: (1) commits an 
act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or 
death; or (2) intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon 
another. 
 MINN. STAT. § 609.2242, subdiv. 1.  The statute’s penalty section makes a simple 
assault a felony when the defendant has prior convictions for a variety of crimes, 
even though they are not “domestics” and include juvenile convictions no matter 
how young the child was at adjudication.  Id. subdiv. 4. 
 16. The legislature has provided for use of juvenile adjudications as predicate 
offenses and as enhancements in a variety of criminal contexts.  E.g., MINN. STAT. § 
169A.03, subdiv. 20 (including prior juvenile adjudications in the definition of a 
prior impaired driving conviction for purposes of driving while impaired laws); id. 
§ 609.224, subdivs. 2, 4 (enhancing fifth-degree assault to gross misdemeanor or 
felony based on previous adjudications of delinquency); id. § 609.2242, subdivs. 2, 
4 (enhancing domestic assault to gross misdemeanor or felony based on previous 
adjudications of delinquency); id. § 609.377, subdiv. 3 (enhancing malicious 
punishment of a child to a felony based on previous adjudications of 
delinquency); id. § 609.749, subdiv. 4 (enhancing harassment to a felony based on 
previous adjudications of delinquency); id. § 624.713, subdiv. 1 (making persons 
adjudicated delinquent for a crime of violence ineligible to possess a firearm); see 
also State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 614 (Minn. 2006) (listing the new ways in 
which juvenile adjudications may be used as predicate offenses). 
6
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hearing.  The third part of this article contends that the use of 
prior juvenile adjudications to enhance criminal offenses violates 
due process.  Due process requires the state to first prove the fact of 
conviction, and second the reliability of the adjudication.  This 
article exposes serious flaws in the hypothesis that juvenile court 
adjudication bears protections comparable to the adult jury-trial 
system. 
In conclusion, this article proposes eliminating the practice of 
using juvenile adjudications to enhance offenses.  If DW’s family 
situation had not placed him in institutional settings, his behavior 
might have been better controlled.  Furthermore, but for zero-
tolerance policies,17 DW’s outbursts at school may not have come to 
the attention of the police.  Few adults would have been prosecuted 
for DW’s conduct, and if they had, most adults would much more 
vigorously defend against those prosecutions.  The article 
concludes with some proposals for ending the practice of 
enhancing charges with prior juvenile adjudications, as it is 
inherently unfair. 
II. PROSECUTING JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
ADJUDICATIONS 
Scholars have documented the history of Minnesota’s juvenile 
court to a great degree.18  The principle goal in establishing a 
 
 17. For discussion of the meaning and impact of zero-tolerance policies and 
other approaches, see C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent 
Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 681 (2005); 
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 982–86 (1995). 
 18. See, e.g., McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 612 (discussing the purpose and history of 
the Minnesota juvenile system).  William Mitchell Law Review articles on 
Minnesota’s Juvenile Court history include: Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty and 
Juvenile Justice for All: Extending the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 835 (1994); Lisa McNaughton, Extending Roper’s Reasoning to 
Minnesota’s Juvenile Justice System, 32 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1063 (2006); John M. 
Stuart & Amy K. R. Zaske, What Does a “Juvenile Adjudication” Mean in Minnesota? 
Some New Answers After a Century of Change in Juvenile Court, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 919 (2006); Wright S. Walling & Stacia Walling Driver, 100 Years of Juvenile 
Court Practice in Minnesota—A Historical Overview and Perspective, 32 WM. MITCHELL. 
L. REV. 883 (2006); Micala R. Gordon, Note, Case Note: It Doesn’t Have to End this 
Way: The Minnesota Supreme Court Declares That the Sentence of Life Without Release as 
Imposed on a Juvenile is Neither Cruel Nor Unusual in State v. Martin, 36 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1271 (2010); Emily A. Polachek, Note, Juvenile Transfer: From “Get 
Better” to “Get Tough” and Where to Go From Here, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1162 
(2009). 
7
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juvenile court system was the rehabilitation of youthful offenders.19  
However, as the rate of juvenile crime rose, courts became more 
punitive, and juvenile court practices came to resemble traditional 
court prosecutions for adult offenders.20  Concern over fair 
treatment mounted, eventually compelling the United States 
Supreme Court to curb these abuses through a due process 
“explosion,” thus ensuring juveniles most constitutional 
protections.21   
 
 19. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1967) (“The early reformers were 
appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be 
given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals.  They 
were profoundly convinced that society’s duty to the child could not be confined 
by the concept of justice alone.  They believed that society’s role was not to 
ascertain whether the child was ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent,’ but ‘[w]hat is he, how has he 
become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of 
the state to save him from a downward career.’  The child—essentially good, as 
they saw it—was to be made ‘to feel that he is the object of (the state’s) care and 
solicitude,’ not that he was under arrest or on trial.  The rules of criminal 
procedure were therefore altogether inapplicable.  The apparent rigidities, 
technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and 
procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded.  The idea of crime and 
punishment was to be abandoned.  The child was to be ‘treated’ and 
‘rehabilitated,’ and the procedures, from apprehension through 
institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 470, 187 N.W. 226, 227 (1922) 
(“The whole tenor of the [juvenile court] act indicates that the sole purpose is the 
welfare of the delinquent as well as the dependent or neglected child.  The 
treatment accorded the two classes is essentially the same.  The rights of the 
parents are amply protected. . . .  That the delinquency charge is not intended as a 
proceeding to punish for a crime . . . [that w]e consider [the juvenile court act] 
designed to secure the welfare of delinquent children, and not to punish them, 
and the restraint put on them to secure that end is not imprisonment, but 
parental control by the state in cases where parents have failed.”). 
 20. Similarities between those two systems led the Court in other cases to 
apply other constitutional protections to juvenile court.  Barry C. Feld, The 
Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based 
on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1111, 1140–43 (2003); see also McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 612. 
 21. In Gault, the Court held that juveniles were entitled to due process 
protections that attach in criminal cases; specifically, the right to notice of charges, 
the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.  Three years 
after Gault, the Supreme Court held that charges against juveniles must be proven 
by the same standard applicable to criminal cases—beyond a reasonable doubt.  In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).  Then, in 1975, the Court held that double 
jeopardy protections apply to juvenile delinquency cases.  Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 
519, 541 (1975).  Unfortunately, juveniles have no constitutional right to a jury 
trial.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545  (1971) (plurality opinion) 
(“[T]rial by jury in the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional 
8
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A steep rise in juvenile crime occurred between the late 1980s 
and mid-1990s.22  In response, the legislature enacted measures 
such as the Extended Juvenile Justice (“EJJ”) legislation, which was 
designed to “get tough on crime” while retaining some of the 
traditional juvenile justice protections.23  EJJ came to Minnesota in 
199424 as an effort to balance rehabilitative goals with societal 
protection.25  
 
 
 
 
requirement.”); see also In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836, 841 n.9 (Minn. 1987) 
(suggesting approval of McKeiver, as noted in McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 612 n.7). 
 22. E.g., James C. Backstrom & Gary L. Walker, The Role of the Prosecutor in 
Juvenile Justice: Advocacy in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, 32 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 963, 964 (2006) (“Arrests of juvenile offenders for murder 
skyrocketed between 1985 and 1993, rising approximately 150%.  Juvenile arrests 
for aggravated assault also rose dramatically by more than 120% from 1983 to 
1994.  Total arrests of juveniles for serious, violent offenses increased by 67% 
between 1985 and 1994.  Arrests of juveniles for weapons offenses rose by 93% 
during this same timeframe.  In many areas of our country, substantial growth also 
occurred in nonviolent juvenile crime during this time period.  The growth rates 
in juvenile crime between 1985 and 1994 far outpaced the rate for adults, which 
began to decline in most categories beginning in 1992.” (footnotes omitted)).  But 
see LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF BALANCE: 
YOUTH, RACE, AND CRIME IN THE NEWS (2001), available at http://www.cclp.org
/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf (noting that the most significant factor in the 
public’s misinformation is the distortion of juvenile crime by the news media).  A 
comprehensive examination of crime in the news conducted by Lori Dorfman and 
Vincent Schiraldi in 2001 found that: (1) the press reported juvenile crime out of 
proportion to its actual occurrence; (2) violent crime, although representing only 
twenty-two to twenty-four percent of juvenile crime from 1988 to 1997, dominated 
the media’s coverage of juvenile offenses; (3) the media presented crimes without 
an adequate contextual base for understanding why the crime occurred; (4) press 
coverage unduly connected race and crime; and (5) juveniles were rarely covered 
by the news other than to report on their violent criminal acts.  Id. at 8–26. 
 23. See Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kari L. Lillesand, Extended Jurisdiction 
Juveniles in Minnesota: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1303, 1304 
(1999) (discussing the reasoning and circumstances of Minnesota’s creation of the 
EJJ). 
 24. 1994 Minn. Laws, ch. 576, § 14 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 
260B.130 (2008)); see also Feld, supra note 17, at 1038–51 (describing the genesis 
of the EJJ prosecution statute); Mary R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door 
to Prison: Waiver Reform, “Blended Sentencing,” and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2001) (evaluating implementation of 
Minnesota’s EJJ statute in Hennepin County); Stuart & Zaske, supra note 18, at 
938. 
 25. Clarke, supra note 17, at 682; see also Feld, supra note 17, at 982–86. 
9
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Ever younger children are being prosecuted in juvenile court.26  
Increasingly, juveniles are being “waived” into adult court.27  
Legislatures across the country have swept away many of the 
hurdles traditionally imposed to prevent the transfer of children to 
traditional adult court.28  The zero-tolerance29 policies of the 1990s 
continue to reverberate in juvenile proceedings.30  State legislatures 
 
 26. E.g., Curtis Krueger, Under 12, Under Arrest, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 
17, 2000), available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/121700/TampaBay/Under
_12__Under_Arres.shtml. 
 27. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.125, subdiv. 1 (stating that a juvenile offender who 
has committed a serious offense may be waived from juvenile court to adult court).  
Sometimes this is a discretionary waiver, where the prosecutor files a motion to 
have the young offender tried as an adult.  See id. § 260B.141, subdiv. 4.  After a 
hearing, where evidence is presented for and against a waiver, the judge decides 
whether the offender should be tried as a juvenile or an adult.  See id. § 260B.125, 
subdiv. 4.  Sometimes, this is a mandatory waiver, where the law requires the young 
offender to be tried as an adult.  E.g., id. subdiv. 5.  Many states have passed laws 
allowing prosecutors to file adult charges against juveniles for certain serious 
offenses, without having to apply for a waiver.  E.g., id.  Between 1992 and 1997 
forty-five states made it easier to transfer juveniles to adult court.  Jennifer Park, 
Note, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A Legislative Solution for 
Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 786, 797 (2008).   
 28. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 96–97 (2006), available at 
http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf (noting 
that as many state legislatures have made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders 
into the adult criminal justice system, sentencing options have been increased and 
expanded to include punitive aspects and confidentiality laws have been relaxed); 
see also Clarke, supra note 17, at 673–76 (discussing the evolution of punitive 
philosophy with respect to children); Sacha M. Coupet, What to Do with the Sheep in 
Wolf’s Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive 
Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1303, 1317–18 (2000) 
(discussing legislative reform of the juvenile justice system); Park, supra, at 797. 
 29. See generally RALPH C. MARTIAN, II, AM. BAR ASS’N, ZERO TOLERANCE POLICY 
REPORT, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/zerotolreport.html 
(discussing state and local enactments and school district rules, providing for 
punishment up to and including expulsion for any infraction, no matter how small 
or allegedly excusable of certain school rules, such as bringing weapons, drugs, or 
alcohol to the school premises). 
 30. Id.; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Post-Racialism in the Inner City: Structure and 
Culture in Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 921, 957–58 (2010) (“In 2000, states recorded 
‘over three million school suspensions and over 97,000 expulsions.’  Statistically, 
advocates report, ‘a child who has been suspended is more likely to be retained in 
grade, to drop out, to commit a crime, and/or to end up incarcerated as an adult.’  
In addition to suspension and expulsion, students increasingly suffer arrest and 
referral to law enforcement officials or juvenile courts for prosecution.”); Linda F. 
Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in America, 5 J.L. 
& POL’Y 223 (1996); Margaret Graham Tebo, Zero Tolerance, Zero Sense, 86 A.B.A. J. 
40, 41 (2000) (“Nationwide, statistics gathered by the Justice Policy Institute and 
the U.S. Department of Education show that crime of all sorts is down at public 
10
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have aggressively cracked down on juvenile crime, criminalizing 
conduct and lengthening incarcerations.31  Juvenile adjudications 
increasingly inflict wide-reaching collateral consequences.32   
These transformations in juvenile justice theory have had 
lingering consequences.33  Traditionally, juvenile courts have been 
private and closed to the public.34  As a policy matter, it was 
believed that youthful offenders should not be stigmatized forever 
because of one mistake.35  However, in a variety of ways, 
adjudications follow the juvenile into adulthood.   
Although not a conviction, an adjudication of delinquency has 
many consequences.  Some jurisdictions preclude persons with 
certain juvenile adjudications from possessing firearms.36  Such 
 
schools since 1990—some studies say by as much as 30 percent.  Less than 1 
percent of all violent incidents involving adolescents occur on school grounds.”). 
 31. Park, supra note 27, at 789 (“After a perceived wave of violent juvenile 
crime in the 1980s and 1990s, however, state legislators actively increased penalties 
for juvenile crime and shifted the purpose of the juvenile court from 
rehabilitation to punishment.”). 
 32. Alfieri, supra note 30, at 957–58.; see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Collateral 
Consequences of Juvenile Proceedings, 15 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. MAG. 2, 59 (2000), available 
at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjmcollconseq1.html. 
 33. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice in Minnesota: Framework for the Future, 
COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://www.crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=46 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (discussing the negative consequences of the changes in 
the juvenile justice system in Minnesota). 
 34. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 2.01.  Juvenile court proceedings are closed to the 
public except as provided by law.  Id.  Rule 2.01 allows persons authorized by 
statute to attend juvenile court proceedings.  Id.  Authorized persons include 
members of the public, in cases where a juvenile over age sixteen is alleged to have 
committed a felony, and victims.  Id.  The public is also entitled to be present 
during a juvenile certification hearing where a juvenile over age sixteen is alleged 
to have committed a felony, except that the court may exclude the public from 
portions of a certification hearing to discuss psychological material or other 
evidence that would not be accessible to the public in an adult proceeding.  MINN. 
STAT. § 260B.163, subdiv. 1(c)(2) (2008).  The statute does not currently permit 
exclusion when similar material is being presented in an extended jurisdiction 
juvenile proceeding.  This may simply be an oversight.  Rule 2.02 permits 
exclusion of persons from hearings, even when they have a right to participate, to 
serve the child’s best interests.  MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 2.02.  “The Juvenile Court is 
theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the child and of society rather 
than adjudicating criminal conduct.  The objectives are to provide measures of 
guidance and rehabilitation . . . not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and 
punishment.”  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). 
 35. Giardino, supra note 30, at 251 (“[Minors] do not possess mature 
judgment and may not fully realize the consequences of [their] acts . . . therefore 
[such individuals] should not generally have to bear the stigma of a criminal 
conviction for the rest of [their lives].” (quotation omitted)). 
 36. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 260B.245 subdiv. 1(b) (“A person who was adjudicated 
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persons may be required to submit to DNA testing and 
fingerprinting.37  Many employers require job applicants to submit 
to criminal background checks.38  If a juvenile’s fingerprints are on 
file, then the record may come up.39  Despite traditional provisions 
regarding the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings,40 adjudicated 
juveniles may have their identities entered into police intelligence 
databases, such as gang membership databases.41  In certain cases, 
an adjudication of delinquency may affect eligibility for public 
housing and other benefits.42  Adjudications may factor into judicial 
determination of “patterned sex offenders”43 and require lifetime 
registration as predatory offenders.44   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
delinquent for . . . a crime of violence . . . is not entitled to ship, transport, possess, 
or receive a firearm for the remainder of the person's lifetime.”). 
 37. E.g., id. § 299C.105, subdiv. 1(a)(3) (stating that juvenile detention 
facilities shall take biological specimens for DNA testing). 
 38. See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and 
Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 185 (2007–
2008) (noting that private providers of background checks to clients, such as 
employers, are thriving); Kristen A. Williams, Employing Ex-Offenders: Shifting the 
Evaluation of Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 521, 535 (2007) (“[E]mployers are increasingly turning to background 
checks to screen out potentially dangerous employees.”). 
 39. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5038(d), (f) (2006) (providing that in some 
circumstances, where a juvenile is prosecuted as an adult or after his or her 
thirteenth birthday, he or she shall be fingerprinted and photographed); 43 C.J.S. 
Infants § 24 (2010) (“A statute may allow the fingerprinting of a juvenile of a 
specified age or older charged with delinquency based on an act that would be a 
crime if committed by an adult and it may permit the retention of the fingerprint 
records for criminal identification purposes.”).  
 40. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979) (noting that 
one of the historically important characteristics of a juvenile court proceeding is 
its confidentiality, especially shielding the process from the public and media in 
order to reduce stigma on the juvenile). 
 41. MINN. STAT. § 299C.091, subdiv. 1. 
 42. Public housing authorities have the right to evict families of delinquent 
children, even if their delinquent conduct does not occur on public housing 
property.  See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 133–36 
(2002). 
 43. See MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subdiv. 1b(a)(4). 
 44. Id. subdiv. 6(d). 
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The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines allow consideration of a 
juvenile record in sentencing adults.45  Judges may use juvenile 
adjudications in sentencing; however, getting more time for a 
felony conviction is fundamentally different from changing a 
maximum ninety-day sentence to a five-year prison sentence.46  
These are just some of the ways in which juvenile adjudications can 
plague one into adulthood.  Without efforts to mitigate deficits 
both inherent (the juvenile mind and social development) and 
transitory (adequate funding to train and supply juvenile 
defenders), society will find increasingly damaging consequences.47 
 
 45. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § II.B.401 (2010), available at 
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/guide10.pdf.  The comments to the 
provision state:  
The juvenile history item is included in the criminal history index to 
identify those young adult felons whose criminal careers were preceded 
by repeated felony-type offenses committed as a juvenile.  The 
Commission held several public hearings devoted to the issue of using 
juvenile records in the criminal history index.  Those hearings pointed 
out differences in legal procedures and safeguards between adult and 
juvenile courts, differing availability of juvenile records, and differing 
procedures among juvenile courts.  As a result of these issues, the 
Commission originally decided to establish rigorous standards regulating 
the consideration of juvenile records in computing the criminal history 
score. 
Id. at 16–17. 
 46. For violation of the felony domestic abuse statute, Minnesota law 
provides:  
[W]hoever violates the provisions of this section or section 609.224, 
subdivision 1, within ten years of the first of any combination of two or 
more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions or 
adjudications of delinquency is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced 
to imprisonment for not more than five years or payment of a fine of not 
more than $10,000, or both. 
MINN. STAT. § 609.2242, subdiv. 4. 
 47. Charles Joseph Hynes, Reducing Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Delinquency 
Adjudications, 2010 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 102A, available at http://www.abanet.org
/leadership/2010/midyear/daily_jourmal/102A.pdf.  The ABA report expresses 
the Bar’s concern regarding the increased breadth and severity of collateral 
consequences to juvenile adjudications:  
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges federal, state, 
territorial and local governments to increase the opportunities of youth 
involved with the juvenile or criminal justice systems and to prevent the 
continuing discrimination against those who have been involved with 
these systems in the past by limiting the collateral consequences of 
juvenile arrests, adjudications, and convictions. 
Id. 
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III. COLLATERAL ATTACK OF PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS 
This section of the article examines the case law regarding 
collateral attack of juvenile adjudications in subsequent 
prosecutions.  In DW’s case, weaknesses in the available juvenile 
court records exposed the enhancement element of the complaint 
to collateral attack.  DW disputed probable cause for the offense 
based upon a challenge to the prior adjudications.  After spotting 
the issue, we needed a way to challenge the prior adjudications.  No 
reported Minnesota case directly addressed prior adjudications 
used to enhance the charge.  However, prior convictions have been 
used to enhance a sentence, and have been accepted as an exception 
to the proof requirements established in Apprendi v. New Jersey.48  
Minnesota accepts that prior convictions used to enhance felony 
sentencing generally are not subject to collateral attack.49  We filed 
a probable cause challenge for a pretrial hearing to the court, 
which avoided allowing the jury to hear about the prior conviction.  
If the court ruled against DW, we could stipulate to the 
enhancement and still keep knowledge of the priors from the jury.   
A. The Development of Minnesota Law on Collateral Attack 
As in most jurisdictions, the collateral attack of prior 
convictions has a long and complicated history in Minnesota law.50  
As a general rule, a criminal defendant’s prior convictions are 
presumptively valid; thus, a trial court “need not review the 
 
 48. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 
(2004). 
 49. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn. 2006) (“The Apprendi/Blakely 
rule requires that facts used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the 
statutory maximum provided for the offense must be found by a jury or admitted 
by the defendant.  Prior convictions are a well-recognized exception to the rule.” 
(citations omitted)); State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. 2005) (“[I]t 
appears that, after Blakely, the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi 
retains validity . . . .”). 
 50. In State v. Cook, 275 Minn. 571, 572, 148 N.W.2d 368, 369–70 (1967), the 
court refused to reverse a conviction for an offense enhanced by the action of the 
Department of Motor Vehicles.  The court reasoned that the defendant had the 
right to a hearing on the order, and “[u]nder well-settled principles” he may not 
collaterally attack the order.  Id. at 369.  The decision does not cite any Minnesota 
authority on the law, but does cite out-of-state cases. 
14
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procedures that led to [the] prior conviction.”51  Because collateral 
attacks on prior convictions “weaken the finality of judgments,” 
they are allowed only in unique cases.52  Over time, the “unique 
case” standard eroded to protect only uncounseled pleas.53  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that Minnesota law 
extends the right to counsel beyond the dictates of the federal 
constitution to any case that may lead to incarceration.54   
In Nordstrom, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a 
Wisconsin criminal conviction in which the defendant was not 
represented by counsel could not be used to enhance a subsequent 
DWI offense to a gross misdemeanor if the right to counsel was not 
properly waived.55  The Nordstrom court was concerned that an 
accused person may be incarcerated without the assistance of 
counsel to present potential defenses.56  Its reasoning rested on 
federal law stating that a person may collaterally attack a prior 
conviction on constitutional grounds and have it invalidated in a 
subsequent proceeding for the purposes of an enhanced penalty 
statute.57  
As recently as 2006, the Nordstrom rule had become articulated 
as, “the defendant cannot collaterally attack the validity of those 
prior convictions except by showing that the other state lacked 
jurisdiction or that the recognition of the conviction would 
improperly interfere with important interests of the State of 
Minnesota.”58  In Schmidt, the supreme court reiterated the central 
holding of Nordstrom—that a criminal defendant may collaterally 
attack a prior Minnesota conviction on the ground that it arose 
from an uncounseled plea of guilty.59  The Nordstrom rule applies 
 
 51. State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988). 
 52. Id. (“Ordinarily, in computing a criminal history score, the sentencing 
court need not review the procedures that led to a prior conviction and a 
collateral attack will be allowed only in ‘unique cases.’” (quoting State v. Edmison, 
379 N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn. 1985))); see also Pilger v. State, 337 N.W.2d 695, 698 
(Minn. 1983) (“There may be cases in which the sentencing court, in determining 
the defendant’s criminal history score, should look at the procedures that led to 
the prior conviction.”). 
 53. See, e.g., State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904–05 (Minn. 1983) 
(holding that a prior uncounseled DWI guilty plea could not be used to convert 
the second DWI offense into a misdemeanor). 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. at 905. 
 56. See id. at 904. 
 57. Id. (citing Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)). 
 58. State v. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 2006). 
 59. Id. at 533 (citing Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d at 905). 
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only if the uncounseled guilty plea was obtained in violation of a 
person’s constitutional rights.60  The Schmidt court observed that 
the unconstitutional “‘failure to appoint counsel [is] a unique 
constitutional defect’ that presents a jurisdictional issue that can 
always be raised by collateral challenge.”61  Although in Schmidt the 
defendant lost his argument that his DWI charge could not be 
enhanced by a prior, uncounseled chemical test, the court affirmed 
the collateral attack of prior convictions for enhancement under 
limited and compelling circumstances.62   
There was some confusion over the status of the Nordstrom rule 
due to the overruling of a federal case that had provided some of 
the rationale for the decision.63  The rationale for permitting 
collateral attacks on prior convictions used for enhancement 
purposes recognized in Nordstrom was weakened by the 1994 United 
States Supreme Court opinion, Nichols v. United States,64 which 
overruled Baldasar.65  Yet, despite the lack of a clear rationale for 
 
 60. See State v. Dumas, 587 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (“[W]e 
read Nordstrom as prohibiting the use of a prior unconstitutionally obtained 
conviction to enhance a subsequent charge.”). 
 61. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 534 (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 
493–96 (1994)).  
 62. Id.  The court opined: 
Schmidt essentially argues that the collateral attack procedure permitted 
in Nordstrom and Warren should be available for a prior conviction that 
was obtained in violation of our decision in Friedman that the Minnesota 
Constitution provides a right to counsel for a DWI test decision.  But 
Nordstrom and Warren do not support collateral attack in this case for 
several reasons.  First, each involved the effects of a prior Minnesota 
conviction.  Second, each involved the more fundamental decision to 
plead guilty to a charge and, thus, waive the whole array of trial rights.  In 
contrast, the Friedman right to counsel is described as a “limited right” 
applicable to the decision to participate in a chemical test during a police 
traffic investigation.  Thus, the precise issue is whether Nordstrom and 
Warren should be extended to include the limited right to counsel that 
exists in Minnesota for test decisions and to apply to convictions 
rendered in another state where no equivalent right to counsel exists. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 63. See State v. Dukowitz, No. C4-01-856, 2002 WL 338296, at *1 n.1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2002) (internal citations omitted) (“The continuing vitality of the 
Nordstrom holding that a prior misdemeanor conviction may be collaterally 
attacked and invalidated for enhancement purposes is subject to question. . . . For 
[the] purpose of our analysis, we assume without deciding that Nordstrom 
continues to represent Minnesota law.”). 
 64. 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
 65. Similarly, in Dumas, the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated:  
Initially, we note that the continuing vitality of Nordstrom may be subject 
to question.  The Nordstrom court relied in part on the reasoning of the 
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permitting a defendant to collaterally attack a revocation in a 
subsequent enhancement proceeding, the appellate court has 
adhered to the assumption that such a collateral attack is permitted 
in some circumstances, and not merely for uncounseled pleas.66  
B. The McFee Problem 
In State v. McFee,67 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
juvenile adjudications fall within the prior conviction exception to 
the Apprendi/Blakely rule and may be used in calculating a criminal 
history score without submitting the facts of the adjudication to a 
jury.68  McFee notes that Minnesota courts have long approved the 
use of prior juvenile adjudications in calculating a defendant’s 
criminal history score under the Sentencing Guidelines.69  In McFee, 
the defendant sought review of his sentence on the grounds that 
the sentencing court violated Blakely70 by using prior juvenile 
adjudications in computing his criminal history score.71  He alleged 
 
United States Supreme Court in Baldasar v. Illinois.  Baldasar, however, 
has been overruled by Nichols v. United States.  Because the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has not addressed Nordstrom since Nichols was decided, we 
assume for purposes of our analysis that Nordstrom continues to represent 
the law in Minnesota.   
Dumas, 587 N.W.2d at 302 (internal citations omitted). 
 66. See State v. Mellet, 642 N.W.2d 779, 788–89 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review 
denied (Minn. July 16, 2002). 
 67. 721 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. 2006).  
 68. Id. at 619; accord State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. 2005) 
(“[A]fter Blakely, the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi retains 
vitality and it is constitutional for a defendant’s sentence to be increased based on 
a prior conviction without submitting the fact of the conviction to the jury.”); State 
v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 48 (Minn. 2005) (rejecting the claim that the assignment 
of a custody status point does not fall within the prior-conviction exception); State 
v. Turnball, 766 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).  
 69. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 614–15. 
 70. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 296 (2004) (holding that any facts, 
except a prior conviction, that may be used to increase a sentence beyond a 
“statutory maximum,” which may include a presumptive guidelines sentence, must 
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to 
the facts or waives the right to a jury trial as to those facts and submits them to the 
judge for decision). 
 71. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 609.  In 1980, “Minnesota became the first state to 
adopt legally-binding sentencing guidelines, and it was the first state to employ a 
permanent, independent sentencing commission to develop and monitor the 
implementation of guidelines and make other recommendations related to 
sentencing.”  Richard Frase, Sentencing Policy and Criminal Justice in Minnesota: Past, 
Present, and Future, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://www.crimeandjustice.org
/councilinfo.cfm?pID=52 (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).  Minnesota uses a 
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a Sixth Amendment and Due Process violation because juvenile 
adjudications are not “criminal convictions” and also juveniles do 
not enjoy a right to a jury trial.72  Following an extensive review of 
case precedent and the history of the juvenile court system, 
highlighting the latter’s original rehabilitative purpose and the 
change to promoting public safety and reducing juvenile 
delinquency, the court concluded: 
Absent clear direction from the United States Supreme 
Court, we will not upset our precedent upholding the use 
of juvenile criminal behavior in sentencing and the 
carefully-balanced approach the legislature ratified in the 
Guidelines for use of juvenile adjudications in calculating 
criminal history score.  In sum, we hold that it is not 
inconsistent with the legislature’s purpose in maintaining 
the juvenile justice system for sentencing courts to use 
prior juvenile adjudications in calculating criminal history 
under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.73  
McFee seemed to present an insurmountable barrier against 
attacking the juvenile adjudications, except in “unique cases,” 
which had come to mean only uncounseled pleas.74  However, the 
 
“guidelines” approach in felony sentencing.  See generally Frequently Asked Questions, 
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/msgc5
/faqs.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).  A defendant’s prior convictions and custody 
status give the defendant a “criminal history score” and each offense a severity 
ranking.  Id.  The score and ranking combine on a “sentencing guidelines grid” to 
determine a range of months to serve.  Id.  The Guidelines are promulgated 
annually by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, which updates the 
guidelines with any legislative changes and case law analysis or direction from the 
appellate courts.  See id.  The commission also receives notice from trial courts for 
every sentence which deviates from the guidelines, with written grounds 
articulated by the judge.  See id.  The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission provides the following answer to the question “What are the 
Sentencing Guidelines?”: 
The [Sentencing Guidelines Commission] embod[ies] the goals of the 
criminal justice system as determined by the citizens of [our] state 
through their elected representatives.  This system promotes uniform 
and proportional sentences for convicted felons and helps to ensure that 
sentencing decisions are not influenced by factors such as race, gender, 
or the exercise of constitutional rights by the defendant.  The guidelines 
serve as a model for the criminal justice system as a whole to aspire to, as 
well as provide a standard to measure how well the system is working. 
Id. 
 72. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 611. 
 73. Id. at 615. 
 74. In State v. Schmidt, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that 
“collaterally attacking the underlying conviction is [a procedure] that we have 
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McFee decision only reached the question of juvenile court trials.75  
The court left unchallenged the presumption of the accuracy of 
the fact of adjudication as well as the reliability of the juvenile court 
process.   
The McFee case should not be considered as controlling the 
issue presented in DW’s case.  There, the defendant challenged the 
use of juvenile adjudications to enhance his sentence, not enhance 
charging.76  The difference may seem sublime, but nevertheless 
remains essential.  As a sentencing issue, the McFee court focused 
on the use of adjudications in computing a criminal history score as 
a matter of recidivism.77  The court noted: “The question presented 
here is whether his choice to recidivate is relevant to his sentence.  
We believe, as we have said before, that such behavior, even though 
committed by a juvenile, is appropriately considered when 
sentencing the offender as an adult.”78  
C. The Custis Problem 
In Custis—cited by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Schmidt as 
authority from the federal courts over federal constitutional 
protections79—the United States Supreme Court also observed that 
collateral attacks may only be allowed in cases where the right to 
 
authorized on a narrow basis for uncounseled plea agreements.”  712 N.W.2d 530, 
533 (Minn. 2006).  Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly 
limited such collateral attacks to the complete denial of counsel, as distinguished 
even from other constitutionally guaranteed rights.  Custis v. United States, 511 
U.S. 485, 496–97 (1994) (stating that the “failure to appoint counsel for an 
indigent defendant was a unique constitutional defect” and limiting the authority 
to collaterally attack prior convictions to situations in which there was a complete 
denial of counsel, distinguishing this defect from other constitutional infirmities 
such as ineffective assistance of counsel and the failure to assure that a guilty plea 
was voluntary).  The Schmidt court cited Custis approvingly.  See Schmidt, 712 
N.W.2d at 538 n.4. 
 75. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616–17 (“[Petitioner] does not dispute that he 
received all the process and protections that were due to him in connection with 
his juvenile cases.”).  
 76. Id. at 609. 
 77. Id. at 615. 
 78. Id. (citing State v. Peterson, 331 N.W.2d 483, 484 (Minn. 1983) (holding 
that “it was not error” for district court to “assign defendant one point for his 
juvenile record” when calculating his criminal history score)); see also Jackson v. 
State, 329 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Minn. 1983) (noting that defendant’s long juvenile 
record could be used as a basis for dispositional departure under the Guidelines). 
 79. Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 534 (citing Custis, 511 U.S. at 496). 
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counsel has been denied.80  The Custis Court recognized that 
“failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant was a unique 
constitutional defect” which could always be raised as a 
jurisdictional defect.81  The Court then limited collateral attack to 
uncounseled pleas (which it calls a Gideon issue), even in the case of 
other claimed constitutional defects.82  However, the Custis Court’s 
Gideon limitation need not control Minnesota law. 
 Custis did not intend to establish a change in substantive 
constitutional law.  Rather, it set forth a rule of federal criminal 
procedure.  Justice Ginsburg, who voted with the majority in Custis, 
observed the following in Nichols: “Custis presented a forum 
question.  The issue was where, not whether, the defendant could 
attack a prior conviction for constitutional infirmity.”83  Thus, Custis 
presented a procedural question and not a substantive question.  
The Court’s focus on administrative concerns such as convenience 
and finality bears this out.84  Convincingly, the Court concludes by 
observing that Custis could seek relief from his allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction through habeas corpus in state or 
federal court.85  As the California Court of Appeals has stated: “If 
the majority in Custis intended the decision to prohibit 
constitutional attacks on prior convictions in state courts, assuming 
it even has the authority to do so, it would not have allowed Custis 
to litigate his constitutional claims through a state habeas corpus 
proceeding.”86 
 
 80. Custis, 511 U.S. at 492–93 (explaining the law is well established that, with 
the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of a defendant’s right to 
counsel, no constitutional violation occurs when a prior conviction, state or 
federal, is used to enhance a federal sentence). 
 81. Id. at 496. 
 82. Id.  The Court concluded that, outside of the right to appointed counsel 
as recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), lesser violations of the 
federal Constitution (specifically, ineffective assistance of counsel, entry of a plea 
that was not knowing and intelligent, or agreement to a stipulated facts trial 
without being adequately advised of trial rights) did not rise to the level of a 
jurisdictional defect that could be raised by collateral challenge when the 
conviction was used to enhance the defendant’s sentence.  Custis, 511 U.S. at 496; 
see also Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d at 534 (citing Gideon and Custis in addressing whether 
a defendant in Minnesota may collaterally challenge the validity of a prior 
conviction rendered in another state when the prior conviction is offered to 
enhance the defendant’s Minnesota crime). 
 83. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 765 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 84. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 486, 497. 
 85. Id. at 497. 
 86. People v. Soto, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1596, 1603 (1996).  As authority, Soto also 
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IV. A NEW APPROACH: ATTACKING ENHANCEMENT AS PART OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
DW challenged the enhancement priors in the complaint on 
the grounds that the State could not prove that the juvenile courts 
had made adjudications of delinquency.  The challenge attacked 
the validity of the prior juvenile adjudications as part of the 
probable cause determination because the priors had been pleaded 
as elements of the offense.  The issue of probable cause is a matter 
of jurisdiction.87  If the state cannot show there is probable cause to 
believe the defendant committed a crime, then the court has no 
jurisdiction over the defendant.88 
Minnesota has developed a unique approach to litigating 
certain trial issues.  The rules of court provide for an omnibus 
hearing, intended to litigate all pretrial motions as part of an 
 
cites commentators on Custis that have arrived at the same conclusion.  Id. at 1603 
n.3. (citing Alan C. Smith, More Than a Question of Forum: The Use of Unconstitutional 
Convictions To Enhance Sentences Following Custis v. United States, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1323, 1336 (1995); Barry W. Strike, Custis v. United States: Are Unconstitutional 
Prior Convictions Being Used To Increase Prison Terms?, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
267, 291–92 (1995)).  The Nevada Supreme Court articulated: 
[W]e decline this opportunity to adopt such a strict rule limiting 
collateral attacks and note that we are not bound by the Custis decision as 
it involved a federal sentencing law not at issue here and merely 
established the floor for federal constitutional purposes as to when 
collateral attacks of prior convictions may be prohibited. 
Paschall v. Nevada, 8 P.3d 851, 852 n.2 (Nev. 2000). 
 87. See State ex rel. Duhn v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 377, 382, 147 N.W.2d 382, 386 
(1966); State v. Braggs, 577 N.W.2d 516, 519–20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
 88. The Comment to Rule 11 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 
states: 
The current statutory hearing on probable cause has been replaced under 
these rules by a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable 
cause which is to be made in accordance with Rule 10 and heard at the 
Omnibus Hearing pursuant to Rule 11.03.  If such a motion is made, the 
court shall base its probable cause determination upon the evidence set 
forth in Rule 18.06, subd. 1.  In State v. Florence, 306 Minn. 442, 239 
N.W.2d 892 (1976), the Supreme Court discussed the type of evidence 
that may be presented and considered on a motion to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of probable cause.  Nothing in that case or in the rule 
prohibits a defendant from calling any witness to testify for the purpose 
of showing an absence of probable cause.  In determining whether to 
dismiss a complaint under Rule 11.03 for lack of probable cause, the trial 
court is not simply reassessing whether or not probable cause existed to 
warrant the arrest.  Rather, under Florence the trial court must determine 
based upon the facts disclosed by the record whether it is fair and 
reasonable to require the defendant to stand trial. 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11 cmt. (2008 Main Volume). 
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evidentiary, pretrial probable cause hearing.89  In 1964, the United 
States Supreme Court declared that a defendant who challenged 
the admissibility of evidence on constitutional grounds “has a due 
process right to a reliable determination” that the evidence was 
obtained without constitutional infringement.90  In response, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court developed a procedure called a 
Rasmussen hearing (named for the seminal case) to be followed 
with respect to problems of evidence which may arise in connection 
with, particularly, searches and seizures and confessions, as well as 
other constitutional questions.91  The principles in Rasmussen have 
been codified in the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure.92  
The Rasmussen hearing is the logical forum in which to litigate 
whether the state can prove the fact of prior adjudications.93  The 
hearing is testimonial but is not held in front of a jury.94  Also, a 
defendant can stipulate to a prior if there is no issue or demand 
that the prior be proved.95  Trial court judges routinely make 
 
 89. Id. R. 11.  The comment to Rule 11 further provides: 
The Omnibus Hearing provided by this rule is divided into three parts: (1) 
the Rasmussen hearing (Rule 11.02); (2) the hearing of pretrial motions 
of the defendant and prosecution (Rule 11.04); and (3) the hearing on 
other pretrial issues brought up on the court’s initiative (Rule 11.04).  
The hearings on any of these parts may be combined and heard 
simultaneously (Rule 11.07). 
 90. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478 (1972) (referencing Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368 (1964)). 
 91. See State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 553–55, 141 N.W.2d 
3, 13–14 (1966) (“If the defendant elects to contest the admissibility of the 
evidence upon Federal constitutional grounds, a pretrial fact hearing . . . will be 
held . . . with a determination by the trial court as to whether the . . . evidence 
contested will vitiate defendant’s constitutional rights.”). 
 92. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 7.01 (codifying the Rasmussen notice); id. R. 11.02 
(codifying the Rasmussen hearing). 
 93. As the court noted: 
The procedure which we have outlined deals only with evidence obtained 
as the result of a search and seizure and evidence consisting of or 
produced by confessions on the part of the defendant.  However, the 
steps which have been suggested as a method of dealing with evidence of 
this type will indicate to counsel and to the trial courts that the pretrial 
consideration of other evidentiary problems, the resolution of which is 
needed to assure the integrity of the trial when conducted, will be most 
useful and that this court encourages the use of such procedures 
wherever practical. 
Rasmussen, 272 Minn. at 556, 141 N.W.2d at 14–15. 
 94. 8 HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE § 16.12 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that given the nature of the 
evidence at issue in a Rasmussen trial, it is heard in the absence of a jury). 
 95. State v. Berkleman, 355 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Minn. 1984) (explaining that 
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findings and conclusions on record at the hearing’s conclusion.96   
The Rasmussen portion of the trial also serves to litigate 
suppression issues.97  If challenged on constitutional grounds, the 
state must prove the evidence it seeks to introduce was 
constitutionally obtained.98  The constitutional issue affects the 
burden of proof at the trial level, as well as the standard of review 
on the appellate level.  The trial court’s factual conclusions will be 
reversed only where clearly erroneous, but the legal questions will 
be examined de novo.99 
The rule that allows, in a “unique case,” a defendant to 
collaterally attack prior convictions survived despite the Nichols case 
and remains good law.100  State v. Mellet articulated a two-step 
process for a defendant to mount a collateral attack.101  The Mellet 
test states:  
 
 
 
defendants may offer to stipulate prior convictions, yet the offer to stipulate does 
not necessarily take away the State’s right to present related evidence). 
 96. See State v. LaFrance, 302 Minn. 245, 246, 223 N.W.2d 813, 814 (1974) 
(“The trial court [in cases where evidence at a Rasmussen hearing is conflicting] 
acts as finder of facts, deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to 
believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.”).  On appeal, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court will not reverse a trial court’s finding of fact unless it is 
clearly erroneous.  State v. Stephenson, 310 Minn. 229, 231, 245 N.W.2d 621, 623 
(1976). 
 97. See, e.g., Stephenson, 310 Minn. at 230, 245 N.W.2d at 622 (noting 
appellant’s Rasmussen hearing considered a motion to suppress evidence). 
 98. MCCARR & NORDBY, supra note 94, § 16.12. 
 99. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992) (citation omitted) 
(“Normally, this court will only reverse a pretrial decision of the trial court 
suppressing evidence if the State demonstrates ‘clearly and unequivocally that the 
trial court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a 
critical impact on the outcome of the trial.’ However, when reviewing a pretrial 
order suppressing evidence where the facts are not in dispute and the trial court’s 
decision is a question of law, the reviewing court may independently review the 
facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be 
suppressed.”); see also State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999) (“When 
reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently 
review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred 
in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.”). 
 100. See State v. Warren, 419 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1988) (explaining 
collateral attacks are reserved for “unique cases” (quoting State v. Edmison, 379 
N.W.2d 85, 86 (Minn. 1985))).  But see Nichols v. United States, 511 US 738, 746–
47 (1994) (holding, consistent with Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, that 
“uncounseled” misdemeanor convictions, valid due to absence of imposition of 
prison term, may be used to enhance punishment at subsequent conviction). 
 101. State v. Mellet, 642 N.W.2d 779, 789 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
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To properly raise the constitutionality of a [conviction] 
and shift the burden of proof to the state, [a defendant] 
must (1) promptly notify the state that her constitutional 
rights were violated during a prior [case]; and (2) 
produce evidence in support of that contention with 
respect to each challenged [conviction].102   
In Nordstrom, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that “once a 
defendant properly raises the issue of the constitutionality of a 
prior conviction, the state then has the burden of proving that the 
conviction was obtained consistent with constitutional 
requirements.”103 
“[T]he factual ambiguity of delinquency adjudications 
sometimes makes it difficult for criminal courts to determine for 
what offense the juvenile court actually convicted a youth when it 
uses those convictions for sentence enhancements or other 
collateral purposes.”104 Two of DW’s adjudications could not be 
proved to be legal.  Therefore, DW challenged probable cause for 
the enhancement. 
As charged under the enhancement provision of the assault 
statute, the proof of qualified prior adjudications must be 
considered an element of the offense.105  As an element, like any 
other element, the enhancement must be subject to a probable 
cause challenge, and proved as part of the omnibus hearing.106  
Every element of a criminal charge must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.107   
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee 
the right to a jury trial in a criminal case.108  A defendant’s right to a 
jury trial includes the right to be tried on every element of the 
charged offense.109  When stipulating to an element of the offense, 
 
 102. Id. (quotation omitted).  The Mellet procedure has been approved in 
unpublished opinions.  E.g., State v. Holman, No. A07–1443, 2008 WL 4628407, at 
*8 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2008); State v. Patrick, No. A07–1370, 2008 WL 
4006724, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2008). 
 103. Mellet, 642 N.W.2d at 789 (citing State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 905 
(Minn. 1983)). 
 104. Feld, supra note 20, at 1185–86. 
 105. See MINN. STAT. § 609.224 (2008). 
 106. See State v. Florence, 306 Minn. 442, 446, 239 N.W.2d 892, 896 (1976). 
 107. State v. Bluhm, 457 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 460 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1990). 
 108. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; see also MINN. R. CRIM. P. 
26.01, subdiv. 1(1). 
 109. Bluhm, 457 N.W.2d at 260.  
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a defendant effectively waives the right to a jury trial on that 
element and removes evidence regarding that element from the 
jury’s consideration.110  Consequently, a defendant must personally 
waive a jury trial on the element in writing or on the record in 
open court before stipulating at trial to any elements of an 
offense.111  When the prior conviction is uncontroverted, a 
stipulation generally is perceived as beneficial to the defendant 
because it effectively removes potentially prejudicial evidence from 
the jury’s consideration.112  Nevertheless, the prior conviction is an 
essential element of the crime. 
The McFee court ruled that the fact of prior juvenile 
adjudications need not be submitted to the jury to vindicate a 
defendant’s right to trial by jury.113  In his appeal, McFee suggested 
that the proof of prior adjudications be submitted as a jury 
question.114  The court rejected this argument, stating, “[a]s we 
noted in Allen, this type of review is properly performed by the 
district court without need of jury fact finding.”115  The McFee court 
suggested that this may be accomplished by examination of the 
juvenile court records.116  This suggestion returns us to the essential 
problem in DW’s case: the uncertainty in the record of the fact of 
conviction, as well as the obvious unreliability of the due process 
protections actually observed. 
DW’s prior adjudications presented a probable cause issue in 
the traditional sense.  The state could not prove the actual 
adjudications—Apprendi’s “fact of adjudication” standard. 
 
 
 
 110. State v. Berkleman, 355 N.W.2d 394, 397 n.2 (Minn. 1984). 
 111. State v. Fluker, 781 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (citing MINN. 
R. CRIM. P. 26.01, subdiv. 1(2)(a)). 
 112. Berkleman, 355 N.W.2d at 397. 
 113. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn. 2006) (explaining appellant’s 
argument that juvenile adjudications do not fall within the Apprendi exception 
and, thus, must be submitted to a jury for sentencing decisions). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 618 (citing State v. Allen, 706 N.W.2d 40, 48 (Minn. 2005)). 
 116. Allen, 706 N.W.2d at 48 (“Like the fact or character of a prior conviction, 
a defendant’s custody status can be determined by reviewing court records relating 
to that conviction.”). 
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V. USING PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AS AN ELEMENT TO 
ENHANCE CRIMINAL OFFENSES OFFENDS DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
As part of the probable cause challenge, DW fought the 
enhancement as a violation of his constitutional rights.  At each of 
DW’s juvenile hearings, most procedural formalities had been 
observed, including his right to a lawyer.  However, in reviewing the 
proceedings, it became clear that the attention paid to DW focused 
on what to do with DW—on social work rather than criminal 
justice.  This section of the article defends the premise that 
charging a person with a felony based on adjudications made when 
as young as ten years of age117 violates due process.  Juvenile 
adjudications do not guarantee reliability of the outcome; juvenile 
court practice elevates procedural due process formalities over 
substantive due process.  
A. Finding an Issue of Constitutional Dimension 
A due process challenge to the use of prior adjudications 
presents an issue of constitutional dimension.  When faced with 
constitutional issues, a trial court will exact closer scrutiny of 
government actions, and an appellate court will apply the highest 
standard of review.118  Thus, the most effective pretrial challenges 
find some kind of constitutional protection.   
Similar to standards of review, “[s]tandards of proof—
preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond a reasonable 
 
 117. Minnesota juvenile delinquency jurisdiction extends to children as young 
as ten years old.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 260C.007, 260C.101 (2008) (explaining that 
juvenile jurisdiction reaches children under the age of eighteen with some 
exceptions).  Generally, children under ten who commit delinquent acts are 
treated as “children in need of protection and services” (commonly referred to as 
“CHIPS”) under section 260C.007, subdivision 6, of the Minnesota Statutes.  
However, Minnesota’s largest county, Hennepin, received money for a “Targeted 
Early Intervention” program to research offenders under ten.  See MICHELLE 
DECKER GERRARD & GREG OWEN, DELINQUENTS UNDER 10: TARGETED EARLY 
INTERVENTION 1 (2000), available at http://www.wilder.org/download.0.html?report
=1142&summary=1.  A December 2000 report which described the program noted 
a median age of 8.8 years for children identified as first-time offenders in the 
program at that time.  Id. at 2. 
 118. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS JURISDICTION AND 
PRACTICE § 5.13 (3d ed. 1999) (“When a constitutional question is present, the 
appellate court should be . . . much less deferential to the . . . lower court whose 
action it is reviewing. . . .  [A]ppellate courts often will make a de novo review not 
only of the constitutional claim but also of the factual basis upon which it is said to 
rest.”). 
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doubt—reflect society’s interests in the correct outcome of cases.”119 
[S]ociety’s interest in the outcomes of criminal cases is 
regarded as quite high, and the trier of fact is asked to be 
satisfied “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the highest 
standard of proof.  The disutility of convicting an 
innocent person is viewed as being much greater than the 
disutility of freeing a guilty one; hence, the probability of 
error is intentionally weighted in the defendant’s favor.120  
B. A Constitutional Theory: Due Process and the “Fact of Conviction”  
The cases considering the use of prior juvenile adjudications 
have arisen as part of sentencing issues, rather than the use of a 
prior adjudication as an element of the crime itself.  One 
theoretical rationale for the prior convictions exclusion relies on 
the “fact of conviction.”  DW disputed the “fact” of adjudication.   
As observed by the McFee court, the defendants in the 
underlying cases never disputed the fact of their conviction.121  The 
McFee court held that the use of prior convictions did not offend 
“the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise 
implicated in allowing a judge to determine a ‘fact’ increasing 
punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range” because 
the defendant in that case did not contest the accuracy of the “fact” 
of his prior convictions.122  DW challenged the “fact” of the prior 
adjudications used to enhance the charge from a misdemeanor to a 
felony.  A review of the juvenile court records revealed that not all 
of the “certified adjudications” accurately reflect what actually took 
 
 119. Feld, supra note 20, at 1125 n.34. 
 120. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of 
Standards of Proof, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 161 (1985); see generally Dorothy K. 
Kagehiro, Defining the Standards of Proof in Jury Instructions, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 194 
(1990) (discussing a research study examining  juror comprehension of both legal 
and quantified definitions of standards of proof and the impact of jury 
instructions on verdicts).  
 121. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 610–11 (Minn. 2006).  The court stated: 
The [Apprendi] Court also noted that “the due process and Sixth 
Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to 
determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the 
statutory range” were “mitigated” in Almendarez-Torres because 
“procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of prior conviction,” and 
because the defendant in that case did not contest the accuracy of the “fact” of his 
prior convictions.  
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488 (2000)). 
 122. Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488). 
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place at the hearings.  The certified copies of conviction, as 
submitted by the prosecutor, did not reveal these problems.  
Without proving legal prior adjudications, the enhancement 
violated DW’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.  
Not all juvenile court petitions end as actual adjudications of 
delinquency.  For example, the dispositional provisions allow but 
do not require a district court to continue a case without 
adjudicating a child delinquent “when it is in the best interests of 
the child and the protection of the public to do so.”123  Similarly, a 
district court may continue a juvenile delinquency case without 
adjudicating a child delinquent “[w]hen it is in the best interests of 
the child to do so and when the child has admitted the allegations 
contained in the petition before the judge.”124  This is what 
happened in DW’s case; the judge accepted his admission, but did 
not find him delinquent. 
DW challenged the fact of adjudication for the assault from 
March 21, 2002.  In that case DW admitted the facts in Hennepin 
County, but venue changed to Ramsey County for disposition.  
Unfortunately, no record exists for review in Hennepin County.  
There are no hearing transcripts, court reporter’s recordings, or 
steno notes.  Only one juvenile court document, captioned 
“ORDER,”125 is available for review.   
The order says DW appeared March 25th, represented by 
counsel.  Before the hearing, DW met with a public defender in the 
detention facility.  This lawyer, assigned to represent all the 
children appearing that day on a “Detention Calendar,” would have 
explained to DW his rights at the hearing and what the judge 
would consider in deciding whether to release or hold DW.  They 
would have discussed the facts of the case, especially since DW 
intended to admit the petition.  They also would have tried to find 
 
 123. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05, subdiv. 4(A). 
 124. MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 7 (2008); see In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 
N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasizing permissive language in 
statute), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).  These provisions give a district court 
broad discretion in deciding whether to adjudicate delinquency or continue a case 
without adjudication.  Id. at 244.  They require neither that a district court make 
particularized findings when making the decision nor that it take the “least drastic 
step necessary to restore law-abiding conduct in the juvenile.”  Id. at 245 
(quotation omitted); see also id. at 245–46 (distinguishing decision to adjudicate 
from decision to impose particular disposition). 
 125. The “Order” records the case pedigree, appearances, and some notes on 
proceedings. 
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some alternative to detention.  At the hearing, DW waived his right 
to have a parent present.  He also waived his trial rights, “admitted” 
the assault, and established a factual basis.  The county reduced the 
charge to simple assault in exchange for the admission.  The judge 
accepted the waivers and admission, but did not make any findings. 
DW appeared on two different delinquency petitions at that 
disposition hearing.  The transcript referenced two files with 
different dates and case numbers.  However, the order stated only 
that “[t]he child is adjudicated delinquent” without specifying 
which petition.  As noted at the outset of the article, the judge 
ordered: 
DW, I’m going to follow the recommendations of 
probation.  I’m going to order that you be placed in the 
[name withheld] group home for a period of nine to 
twelve months, that you attend outpatient sexual-offender 
treatment as directed by probation, that you attend your 
psychiatric appointments and follow the medication 
orders, that you perform 24 hours of community work 
service, that you make restitution.  I am going to—you will 
be adjudicated for this offense at this time given the 
nature of the offenses. 
In the Placement Order, the judge made no findings of fact 
specifically designating either petition.  In the order portion, there 
is a single adjudication of delinquency, once again, without 
reference to files or facts.  Juvenile adjudications may not be made 
without “due caution and scrupulous professional dignity” because 
written dispositional findings are essential to meaningful appellate 
review and failure to make sufficient written findings constitutes 
reversible error.126 
DW was never adjudicated delinquent in the petition alleging 
the assault from July 31, 1992.  At the various hearings on the 
petition, the judge never actually made a finding or adjudication of 
delinquency.  A mere entry of an admission or finding of guilt is 
not the same as an adjudication in the way a plea might be 
considered in criminal court.  The rules of juvenile court require 
entry of an order specifying adjudication of delinquency.127  In the 
 
 126. In re Welfare of N.T.K., 619 N.W.2d 209, 211–12 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); 
see also MINN. STAT. § 260B.198, subdiv. 1; MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05, subdiv. 2 
(setting out requirement of findings). 
 127. Rule 15.05 states: 
On each of the charges found by the court to be proved, the court shall 
either: 
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Disposition Order, the judge “continue[d] the case for review and 
[placed] the child on probation.”  The court never entered a 
finding of delinquency, so there was no “adjudication.” 
C. A Constitutional Theory: Due Process and “Reliability of Convictions” 
The Apprendi Court’s holding is quite straightforward: “Other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”128  
Courts should exclude satisfied prior convictions if they come with 
guarantees of reliability inherent in the truth-finding engine of 
criminal trials.129  Apprendi emphasized that “the requirements of 
trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, 
and proving those facts beyond reasonable doubt” constituted 
essential elements of due process.130  Apprendi exempted the “fact of 
a prior conviction” because criminal defendants enjoyed a 
constitutional right to a jury trial for the prior conviction, which 
assured accuracy and reliability.131  To meet due process: 
[P]ractice must at least adhere to the basic principles 
undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts 
necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and proving 
those facts beyond reasonable doubt.  As we made clear in 
Winship, the “reasonable doubt” requirement “has [a] vital 
role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons.”  
Prosecution subjects the criminal defendant both to “the 
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction 
and . . . the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction.”  We thus require this, among other, 
procedural protections in order to “provid[e] concrete 
 
(A) adjudicate the child delinquent pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, 
section 260B.198, subdivision 1; or 
(B) continue the case without adjudicating the child delinquent and 
order a disposition pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 260B.198, 
subdivisions 1(a) or (b). 
The adjudication or continuance without adjudication shall occur at the 
same time and in the same court order as the disposition.  
MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 15.05, subdiv. 1. 
 128. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 129. See id. at 476. 
 130. Id. at 483–84. 
 131. Id. at 496; see also Courtney P. Fain, What’s In a Name? The Worrisome 
Interchange of Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions”, 49 B.C. L. REV. 495, 
511 (2008). 
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substance for the presumption of innocence,” and to 
reduce the risk of imposing such deprivations 
erroneously.132 
Similarly, the McFee court approved using juvenile 
adjudications based on this same thesis that procedural safeguards 
attach to prior conviction.133  In response to the argument that 
juvenile adjudications lack the right to a jury trial, the McFee court 
focused on reliability and the due process requirements attached to 
juvenile proceedings.134  Recognizing that a jury trial is not 
constitutionally required in juvenile proceedings, the court stated 
that “‘[j]uvenile adjudications, where juvenile defendants have the 
right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the 
right to a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, provide 
more than sufficient safeguards to ensure the reliability that 
Apprendi requires . . . .’”135  The procedural safeguards the McFee 
court envisioned hardly seem evident in DW’s adjudications.  DW 
contested the efficacy of the “procedural safeguards” afforded 
juveniles through the juvenile court system. 
Apprendi and McFee presume that the due process guarantees 
actually result in reliable adjudications.  The Apprendi Court 
exempted any “fact of a prior conviction” because the defendant 
was presumptively afforded due process in the trial that culminated 
in the conviction, therefore making it accurate and reliable.136  The 
McFee court’s decision presumes reliability attached to prior 
convictions.137  The Apprendi Court specifically noted that prior 
convictions are valid in part because of the defendant’s right to jury 
trial and the prosecutor’s burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.138  The Court pointed to its recent decision that 
proposed: 
 
 
 
 132. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483–84 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 
(1970)). 
 133. State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 610–11, 615 (Minn. 2006) (examining 
Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi). 
 134. Id. at 616. 
 135. Id. (quoting United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 
2005)). 
 136. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496. 
 137. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616. 
 138. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
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One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is 
not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration 
used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, and 
certainly unlike the factor before us in this case, a prior 
conviction must itself have been established through 
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, 
and jury trial guarantees.139  
The McFee court decided that “McFee received all of the 
protections to which he was constitutionally entitled when he was 
adjudicated delinquent.”140  However, juvenile adjudications do not 
meet this high standard.  Without guarantees of reliability, 
enhancing an offense with juvenile adjudications violates 
constitutional guarantees of due process, fundamental fairness, and 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 
The due process guarantees that ensure the fairness of 
convictions in adult court do not function the same way in juvenile 
adjudications.  Too many methods, procedures, and practices 
common to juvenile court systems with their overriding concern for 
“the welfare of the child” actually conspire against accuracy in 
deciding guilt.  Among these deficits are: the prevalence of pleas in 
juvenile court, the inhibitions juveniles feel against vigorously 
defending themselves, the lack of a right to a jury trial, poor 
delivery of legal services, adjudications by referees, and little post-
conviction review by juveniles.141  The juvenile court is not a 
criminal court.  Although increasingly punitive,142 the juvenile 
 
 139. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999).  The Apprendi Court 
noted that its holding was “foreshadowed” by the Court’s 1999 opinion in Jones 
“that ‘under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and 
jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment any fact (other than prior 
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an 
indictment . . . and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 476. (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6).  “In Jones, the Court distinguished 
prior convictions from other factors, noting that prior convictions must have been 
established through procedures which satisfied the guarantees of fair notice, 
reasonable doubt, and the jury trial.”  Fain, supra note 131, at 528 n.3 (citing Jones, 
526 U.S. at 249). 
 140. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616. 
 141. See generally Fain, supra note 131 (arguing that it is improper to equate 
juvenile delinquency adjudications with criminal convictions for these very 
reasons). 
 142. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 
2006 NATIONAL REPORT 96–97 (2006) (noting that many state legislatures have 
made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders into the adult criminal justice system, 
sentencing options have been increased and expanded to include punitive aspects, 
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courts’ stated goal continues to be rehabilitative.143 
The Apprendi Court’s premise that using prior juvenile 
adjudications to enhance sentences is without constitutional defect 
has not gone unchallenged.  Since the Court decided Apprendi, 
courts that have considered this issue have gone either way, but 
“the majority of courts that have addressed the issue we face here 
have held that juvenile adjudications fall within the prior 
conviction exception.”144  The McFee court explored the rationale 
presented by both sides, and, as noted, felt satisfied that juvenile 
adjudications “provide more than sufficient safeguards to ensure 
the reliability that Apprendi requires.”145 
In United States v. Tighe,146 a Ninth Circuit panel held that a 
sentencing court could not use prior nonjury juvenile adjudications 
to increase a defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum.147  
The Tighe court reasoned that the basis for the prior conviction 
exception in Apprendi was that the procedural safeguards of a jury 
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the defendant’s prior 
trial satisfied his or her Sixth Amendment rights.148  Quoting 
Apprendi, the Tighe court states: 
There is a vast difference between accepting the 
validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in 
a proceeding in which the defendant had the right 
to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor 
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
allowing the judge to find the required fact under a 
lesser standard of proof.149   
 
 
 
 
 
 
and confidentiality laws have been relaxed), available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov
/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf. 
 143. See, e.g., Fain, supra note 131, at 528 n.178 (citing several cases which note 
the rehabilitative goal of juvenile court). 
 144. McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616. 
 145. Id. (quoting United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005)) 
(citation omitted).   
 146. 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 147. Id. at 1193–94. 
 148. Id. at 1194. 
 149. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000)).  
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The court held that this justification did not apply to a defendant 
in a juvenile adjudication who did not have a right to a jury trial.150  
Accordingly, such adjudications could not enhance a sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum.  “[T]he ‘prior conviction’ 
exception to Apprendi’s general rule must be limited to prior 
convictions that were themselves obtained through proceedings 
that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”151 
In United States v. Jones,152 the Third Circuit took the opposite 
view, holding prior nonjury juvenile adjudications could be used 
for sentence enhancements.153  The Jones court accepted the 
Apprendi (and McFee) premise that the defendant “received all 
process that was due when convicted—for adults that includes the 
right to a jury trial; for juveniles, it does not.”154  The court relied on 
the fact that under McKeiver, due process does not entitle juvenile 
defendants to a jury trial.155  Accordingly, because the adjudications 
complied with what the Constitution required at the time of the 
conviction, the court saw no problem with using them at a later 
time as a prior conviction.156 
Of the two approaches, the Tighe court’s reasoning appears 
closer to recognizing the emphasis that the United States Supreme 
Court has placed on the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee in 
sentencing since the Apprendi decision.  Tighe recognized the 
exceptional nature of the use of prior convictions under Apprendi—
that they are only considered because of the procedural safeguards 
provided in the prior trial.157  Conversely, Jones relied on McKeiver’s 
holding that jury trials are not required in juvenile proceedings; 
however, McKeiver had to do with maintaining the rehabilitative 
and diagnostic functions of the juvenile system.158  That court did 
 
 150. Id.; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (holding 
that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal prosecutions within reach of the 
Sixth Amendment guaranteeing right to an impartial jury in all criminal 
prosecutions); accord McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 612 (referencing the holding in 
McKeiver that there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile 
court).  
 151. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194. 
 152. 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004). 
 153. Id. at 696. 
 154. Id. at 695. 
 155. Id. at 696. 
 156. Id. 
 157. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 158. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545–47 (1971). 
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not consider the reliability issue.159  Jones also predated Apprendi and 
did not consider the possibility of using juvenile adjudications in 
later proceedings.160  The Tighe court’s consideration of Apprendi’s 
reliability requirements better fits the due process protections 
contemplated by that court.161 
As applied to DW’s case, the juvenile court hearings did not 
afford him the “procedural safeguards” envisioned by Apprendi and 
McFee.162  Although McFee’s challenge rested on the lack of jury 
trial in juvenile court, the court did emphasize the importance of 
trial safeguards.163  Thus, DW’s juvenile adjudications do not meet 
the reliability standard for constitutionality.164 
D. A Constitutional Theory: Juvenile Court Due Process Hazards and 
“Reliability” 
1. Due Process Hazards: The Prevalence of Pleas in Juvenile Court 
At his detention hearing on March 25, 2002, DW admitted to 
the assault charge which the county later used to enhance his 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 545–51. 
 161. On the split in jurisdictions, see Fain, supra note 131, at 512–16; Feld, 
supra note 20, at 1196–1214; Molly Gulland Gaston, Note, Never Efficient, But Always 
Free: How the Juvenile Adjudication Question is the Latest Sign That Almendarez-Torres 
v. United States Should be Overturned, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167 (2008); Alyssa 
Malzman, Note, Juvenile Strikes: Unconstitutional Under Apprendi and Blakely and 
Incompatible with the Rehabilitative Ideal, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 171, 
182–84 (2005). 
 162. In McFee, the Minnesota Supreme Court discussed Apprendi in relation to 
Almendaraz–Torres.  State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 610–11 (2006).  According to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns 
raised in Apprendi were mitigated in Almendarz–Torres because of procedural 
safeguards and due to the fact that the defendant did not contest the accuracy of 
the ‘fact’ of his prior conviction.  Id.  
 163. The court stated: 
[T]he prior conviction exception applies, not because the defendant had 
a right to a jury trial in the prior proceeding, but because the prior 
proceeding met all due process requirements that attached to that 
proceeding.  Ultimately, according to the majority, “the question of 
whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt from Apprendi’s general 
rule should not turn on the narrow parsing of words, but on an 
examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are 
so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption.” 
McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616 (quoting United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032–
33 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
 164. See McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 616 (quoting United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 
1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005)).   
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felony.  DW would have met with a court-appointed lawyer the 
morning of the hearing.  This was his only opportunity to consult 
with a lawyer before his hearing.  The two would have discussed his 
legal rights and what might happen at the hearing.  His lawyer 
might have had police reports for the offense before the hearing 
started, but probably not.  His lawyer may have had as many as 
fifteen other children to interview that morning.  The purpose of 
the hearing was to decide whether DW could be released.165  DW 
used this first appearance to admit the offense.  His lawyer would 
have had very little time with DW, could not have explored 
defenses, talked to witnesses, or in any way prepare a defense for 
DW.  However, as with adults, the decision to admit or deny rests 
with the client.166   
The prevalence of pleas in juvenile court is a primary hazard to 
due process in juvenile justice.167  It has been well-established that, 
as a general rule, most of those juveniles who actually possess a 
statutory right to a jury trial waive this right and admit 
delinquency.168  The many constraints on the system encourage 
those juveniles to waive trial rights.169  Still, for those who exercise 
this right, “it is not clear that [they] exercise their right in a 
meaningful way that allows them to benefit from the enhanced 
procedural safeguard.”170  Some juveniles do not even seem to be 
aware of what charge they have admitted.171  Professor Steven A. 
 
 165. See MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 5. 
 166. See MINN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2 (2010).  “It is also recognized that the 
accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions 
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her 
own behalf, or take an appeal.”  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 
 167. KIM BROOKS & DARLENE KAMINE, JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 
IN OHIO 19, 31 (Kim Brooks & Darlene Kamine eds., 2003) [hereinafter OHIO 
REPORT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Ohio_Assessment.pdf. 
 168. See Fain, supra note 131, at 520 n.186.  Although the numbers cited by 
Fain provide only a small sample of the fifty-one juvenile court jurisdictions, the 
uniformity in the high frequency of plea bargaining is notable.  See also Steven A. 
Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 
34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 284–87 (2007) (discussing waiver, its high prevalence in 
juvenile court, and its consequences); cf. Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of 
Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1488–95 (2009) (discussing 
waiver and its relationship to juveniles’ perception of fairness of the process). 
 169. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 168, at 292.  
 170. Fain, supra note 131, at 519 n.181.  There is evidence that most juveniles, 
even where they have the right to trial by jury, plead delinquent.  See id. 
 171. See OHIO REPORT, supra note 167, at 53.  The assessment report on 
juvenile defense in Ohio noted that many juveniles were not aware of what charges 
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Drizin observed:  
The combination of heavy caseloads, juvenile court 
culture that frowns upon advocacy and lawyers who only 
meet their clients on the day of adjudication creates a 
system of representation ripe for wrongful convictions.  In 
Montana, one judge reported that he only had 2–3 trials a 
year and defenders stated that cases rarely go to trial.  
One attorney explained, “I tell the clients the rights that 
they have, but the risks are so low, they don’t want to go 
through with it.  The worst that they can look at is [a 
county facility] until 18.”172  
There is no transcript of the proceedings or other verbatim 
record of DW’s March 25, 2002, Hennepin County Juvenile Court 
hearing.  Nevertheless, the State tried to use an adjudication from 
this hearing against DW.  The only record available was an order 
from the court identifying the parties and issuing the change of 
venue.  The unavailable records made it impossible for the court to 
review the adequacy of the procedural safeguards as promised in 
McFee.  Failure to afford DW a verbatim record violated his right to 
due process of law. 
State v. Nordstrom arose from the State’s failure to produce any 
record of Nordstrom’s prior conviction.173  There was neither a 
transcript nor a plea petition.174  The court observed that both 
constitutional law and Minnesota statute required a record of 
proceedings where incarceration might follow.175  There is a 
constitutional requirement that a valid guilty plea be made 
pursuant to a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights.176  The court 
 
led to their commitment because pleas resulted in charges being dropped or 
modified.  See id.  It is significant that children would plead delinquent and not 
know to what charge they were actually pleading delinquent; this fact may indicate 
that children do not attach much significance to being found delinquent for any 
particular offense, since their maximum time commitment is likely the same (not 
beyond their eighteenth birthday). 
 172. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 168, at 293 (citations omitted). 
 173. State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Minn. 1983) (“There is no 
record whatsoever in relation to Nordstrom’s guilty plea and conviction.”).  In 
Nordstrom, the state enhanced a DWI charge by using a prior conviction in which 
Nordstrom had waived his rights and pled, without counsel and without any kind 
of recording or transcript of the conviction.  Id. at 903. 
 174. Id. at 904 (noting “a verbatim record shall be made or a petition to enter 
a plea of guilty, as provided in the Appendix B to Rule 15, shall be filed with the 
court” for entry of a guilty plea to a misdemeanor (internal quotations omitted)). 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. (citing Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), overruled by Nichols v. 
37
Mahoney and McCollum: DW's Cautionary Tale
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
806 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
also observed that the criminal rules require a record as well.177  
A verbatim record of criminal proceedings ensures that a 
conviction may be properly reviewed as necessary.178  In State v. 
Pederson,179 the defendant wanted to pay his own appellate lawyer 
but have the public defender pay for the necessary transcript.180  
Basically, he qualified for public defender services, but only wanted 
the court to order payment of the transcript fee.181  No rule 
required the public defender to pay for the transcript.182  The court 
observed that the State had to pay for a transcript where a public-
defender-eligible appellant proceeds pro se.183  The court also 
found that many other states provide an indigent appellant with a 
transcript.184  Ultimately, the court found a transcript so critical to 
effective representation that it ordered payment, in the name of 
“the fair administration of justice,” exercising its power to 
“supervise the criminal justice system”.185  
Similarly, in Hoagland v. State,186 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held that a verbatim record was a critical element in the effective 
administration of justice.187  In Hoagland, the defendant appealed a 
 
United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994) (holding uncounseled misdemeanor 
conviction without prison term is valid when used to enhance punishment at 
subsequent conviction)).   
 177. Id.  The court opined: 
Furthermore, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure set out in Rule 
15.09 the record of guilty plea proceedings which must be made by 
Minnesota courts.  In the case of misdemeanors, a verbatim record “shall 
be made” or “a petition to enter a plea of guilty, as provided in the 
Appendix B to Rule 15, shall be filed with the court.”  The Comments to 
Rule 15.09, citing Casarez, Boykin and Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 
288, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273 (1973), note: “This provision for 
either a verbatim record or a petition is included to satisfy the 
constitutional requirement that a plea to a misdemeanor offense 
punishable by incarceration must be shown on the record to be 
knowingly and voluntarily entered.” 
Id. (citing MINN. R. CRIM. P 15.09). 
 178. See id. at 905. 
 179. 600 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 1999). 
 180. Id. at 451. 
 181. Id. at 452–53. 
 182. Id.   
 183. Id. at 453 (discussing State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1988)). 
 184. Id. at 453–54. 
 185. Id. at 454–55 (citing State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Minn. 1999)). 
 186. 518 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 1994). 
 187. Id. at 535 (“When an employee of the judicial system fails to follow clearly 
stated judicial policies and consequently a defendant is deprived of a transcript to 
his trial for appeal; and when it is impossible to reconstruct the trial because of the 
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denial of post-conviction relief.188  The court observed the 
fundamental importance of a trial transcript for judicial review, as 
codified in Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.02, which 
states that “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may 
be considered by the court upon motions for new trial, post-trial 
motions, and on appeal although they were not brought to the 
attention of the trial court.”189   
The court also referred to other jurisdictions with similar 
rules.190  The United States Supreme Court has observed, “The right 
to notice ‘plain errors or defects’ is illusory if no transcript is 
available at least to one whose lawyer on appeal enters the case 
after the trial is ended.”191  Once a defendant establishes that no 
verbatim record of a proceeding is available for review, the burden 
shifts to the state to prove the conviction may be used to enhance a 
later charge.192  A transcript provides crucial due process 
protections of knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional 
rights.193  A transcript also makes possible a subsequent review of 
the adequacy of those waivers both for the defendant’s efforts to 
review the conviction194 and the state’s determination to use the 
prior conviction for either enhancement of a subsequent charge or 
a sentence.195  
2. Due Process Hazards: The Delivery of Legal Services 
Rule 24 of the Juvenile Court Rules requires the court to 
appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the best interests of the 
child in a delinquency proceeding under certain circumstances.196  
Rule 24.01 states: “If the parent, legal guardian or legal custodian is 
 
trial judge’s death, that defendant is entitled to a new trial . . . .”). 
 188. Id. at 532. 
 189. Id. at 535 (citing United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1305–06 (5th Cir. 
1977)). 
 190. Id. at 535–36. 
 191. Id. at 535 (quoting Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280 (1964)). 
 192. State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904–05 (Minn. 1983) (“This 
provision for either a verbatim record or a petition is included to satisfy the 
constitutional requirement that a plea to a misdemeanor offense punishable by 
incarceration must be shown on the record to be knowingly and voluntarily 
entered.”).  
 193. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 193–94 (1971). 
 194. See State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 545, 141 N.W.2d 3, 8 
(Minn. 1966) (citation omitted). 
 195. See State v. McClenton, 781 N.W.2d 181, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 196. MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 24.01. 
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unavailable, incompetent, indifferent to, hostile to, or has interests 
in conflict with the child’s best interests, a guardian ad litem shall 
be appointed.”197  A guardian ad litem has specific legal duties.198  
These duties include investigating the child’s home life, 
interviewing the adults responsible for his care, and advocating for 
his best interests.199  The rules provide several protections for a 
guardian, underscoring their important role in the administration 
of justice in juvenile court.200  The court, in making a determination 
whether a child made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of various 
rights, may take into account the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem.201  
At the disposition hearing on April 8, 2002, DW’s lawyer asked 
the court to recognize the guardian ad litem from the CHIPS case 
and appoint her to the delinquency case on behalf of DW.  The 
actual request read: “Mother’s parental rights were recently 
terminated, and we’re asking that she be appointed guardian ad 
litem for all further proceedings as well.”  THE COURT: “She may.”   
DW was only twelve years old at the time of this hearing.  The 
guardian ad litem never appeared again, and yet her appearance 
was never excused or waived.  Unlike criminal proceedings, where 
each new offense are generally treated as distinct entities, juvenile 
proceedings tend to be one continuous disposition, like an adult 
on probation with new offenses.  The guardian ad litem’s presence 
had been ordered and should have been required. 
The court’s failure to protect DW’s interests, and the choice to 
move the case along, demonstrates a second hazard to due process 
in juvenile courts—the delivery of legal services.  The juvenile 
justice system seems so invested in moving cases along that most 
juveniles waive critical constitutional rights without consulting 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. R. 24.02. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Guardians enjoy the right to attend all hearings.  Id. R. 2.01.  Guardians 
may not be excluded from hearings.  Id. R. 2.02.  The guardian ad litem appointed 
in the delinquency proceeding has a right to participate and advocate for the best 
interests of the child at all hearings.  Id. subdiv. 2.  The guardian has the right to 
appointment of counsel.  Id. R. 3.07.  The child’s lawyer cannot also be the 
guardian.  Id. R. 24.03.  The records of the proceedings, otherwise closed to the 
public, are open to guardians, as they share equal status with the lawyers.  Id. R. 
30.02. 
 201. See id. R. 3.04, subdiv. 1; id. R. 18.05, subdiv. 1(C); id. R. 19.04, subdiv. 
1(C). 
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counsel.  In 2007 the National Juvenile Defender Center,202 
reported that half of all children appearing in juvenile delinquency 
cases appear without a lawyer, and in some jurisdictions this figure 
was as high as ninety percent.203  Without legal representation, and 
considering the handicap immaturity bears, juveniles are pressed 
through the system with little real regard to whether they enter 
pleas which meet the constitutional requirement of being knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary. 
Similarly, Professor Barry Feld, of the University of 
Minnesota Law School, observes that the absence of jury trials 
impacts the administration of justice in a variety of ways. The 
informality permits an atmosphere in which judges feel less 
apprehension about allowing juveniles to proceed without a 
lawyer, which endangers the accuracy and reliability of the 
fact-finding process.  Feld also cites studies which “strongly 
question the quality of representation that appointed attorneys 
provide for those delinquents who do receive the assistance of 
counsel.”204 
The delivery of legal services to juveniles suffers even 
when a lawyer represents the child.  Juvenile defenders 
incessantly complain about overwhelming caseloads. Caseload 
constraints mean that lawyers can devote very little time to 
counseling their young clients, who in any case may not 
understand the court processes, the difficult legal concepts, 
and give little thought to their own future.  Under these 
circumstances, where resolving cases quickly has priority, 
“ensuring individualized justice becomes impossible and 
accurate fact finding becomes irrelevant. . . . The impact on 
children is devastating: their attorneys have only a few minutes 
to spend with them, leaving them to go through the process 
essentially alone.205 
 
 202. “The National Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC) was created in 1999 to 
respond to the critical need to build the capacity of the juvenile defense bar and 
improve access to counsel and quality of representation for children in the justice 
system.”  About Us, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., http://www.njdc.info/about
_us.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).  The NJDC provides a wide range of services 
to juvenile defenders “to address practice issues, improve advocacy skills, build 
partnerships, exchange information, and participate in the national debate over 
juvenile crime.”  Id.    
 203. Patricia Puritz & Katayoon Majd, Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in 
Delinquency Cases: Creating a Paradigm for Specialized Juvenile Defense Practice, 45 FAM. 
CT. REV. 466, 470 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 204. Feld, supra note 20, at 1169–71 (citations omitted). 
 205. Puritz & Majd, supra note 203, at 470; see also Katherine Hunt Federle, The 
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Finally, juvenile court, seen as less important than adult court, 
is viewed by many as a “training ground.”206  Conversely, juvenile 
court may be thought of as the place lawyers spend the end of their 
careers, no longer having to worry about trying jury cases.207  Puritz 
noted that “[m]any attorneys representing children may lack the 
necessary qualifications.  Delinquency practice lacks prestige, and 
many attorneys and judges would prefer to be elsewhere.”208 
Ironically, studies by Professor Feld suggest that juveniles who 
appear without lawyers get “better” outcomes.209  While he 
acknowledges the study’s limitations, his findings and those of 
others suggest—somewhat surprisingly—that juveniles with counsel 
are more likely to be incarcerated and to receive other punitive 
sanctions than those without counsel.210  While the causes are 
difficult to determine conclusively, Feld surmises that the presence 
of juvenile defense lawyers may antagonize judges, and, conversely, 
judges may be more lenient towards juveniles who are not 
represented.211 
 
Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the 
Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1678 (1996) (noting that strong systemic 
pressures discourage zealous advocacy at all stages of cases). 
 206. See Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a 
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 228 (2007) (describing how public 
defender’s offices frequently send their least capable and newest attorneys to 
juvenile cases). 
 207. Cf. Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 798–800 
(2010) (describing structural causes contributing to inadequate representation for 
juveniles, including those “defenders looking for less scrutiny from their 
professional peers or superiors”). 
 208. Puritz & Majd, supra note 203, at 470. 
 209. Feld, supra note 206, at 227–28. 
 210. Id. (stating, based on empirical research, that when juveniles are 
represented in delinquency court, they are less likely to have positive outcomes); 
see also George W. Burruss, Jr. & Kemberly Kempf-Leonard, The Questionable 
Advantage of Defense Counsel in Juvenile Court, 19 JUST. Q. 37, 41 (2002) (finding that 
the presence of an attorney consistently increased the likelihood of juveniles 
receiving out-of-home placements in all settings). 
 211. Feld, supra note 206, at 228–30 (suggesting that represented juveniles may 
fare worse than those who are pro se because their lawyers may be inexperienced, 
incompetent, biased, or overworked, and that judges may punish such juveniles 
more severely because they believe the presence of counsel insulates them from 
appellate reversal).  It is also possible that Feld’s findings result, at least in part, 
from selection bias, meaning that juveniles who are likely to either retain or accept 
appointed counsel may have been charged with more serious offenses, thereby 
leading to more punitive sanctions for reasons other than those suggested above.  
See N. Lee Cooper et al., Fulfilling the Promise of In re Gault: Advancing the Role of 
Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 658–63 (1998) (discussing the 
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3. Due Process Hazards: Failure to Provide Vigorous Defense 
The Ramsey County Juvenile Court failed to protect DW’s 
rights.  The court made an inadequate inquiry into his waivers that 
resulted in a failure to establish that DW waived his rights 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The Rules of Juvenile 
Court provide that a child has the right to have a parent, a lawyer, 
or a guardian ad litem present at any hearing.212  In fact, the child’s 
guardian and parent have an independent right to a lawyer in 
instances where a child may be placed out of his home as a 
consequence.213  Without a verbatim recording of the Hennepin 
County proceedings, we have no way to evaluate the validity of 
DW’s waiver of his parent, family member, or guardian.  There is 
just no evidence of the required waiver from the March 2002 
appearances. 
In the second case, the November 2003 assault, DW had both a 
lawyer and a family member present (his grandfather).  DW waived 
his rights when he pleaded guilty.  However, the waiver of trial 
rights at the arraignment cannot withstand even the simplest of 
review.214  The entire waiver consisted of the following:  
 
 
systemic causes of ineffective representation in juvenile courts, the many reasons 
that children waive counsel, and the ways in which the “cumulative effect of these 
factors is a derogation of juvenile court practice itself”). 
 212. See, e.g., MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 2.03, subdiv. 3 (“The parent, legal guardian 
or legal custodian of a child who is the subject of a delinquency or extended 
jurisdiction juvenile proceeding shall accompany the child to all hearings unless 
excused by the court for good cause shown.”).  
 213. See, e.g., id. R. 3 cmt. (2006 Main Volume) (“Minn. R. Juv. Del. P. 3.07 
implements the rights of a child’s parent(s), legal guardian or legal custodian to 
participate in hearings affecting the child.  After a child has been found to be 
delinquent and state intervention potentially may intrude upon the parent’s 
custodial interests in the child, the parent(s) have an independent right to the 
assistance of counsel appointed at public expense if they are eligible for such 
services.”). 
 214. Rule 8 formulates the inquiry the court must make before accepting as 
valid a waiver of rights and admission.  Id. R. 8.04, subdiv. 1.  Rule 8 mandates 
specific procedures and findings that shall be made before accepting a waiver.  Id.  
Among these are satisfaction that the child understands not only the charges and 
the elements of each charge, but also a factual basis for the plea.  Id.  The court 
must also satisfy itself that the child understands all the trial rights waived, 
including the rights to remain silent, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and 
the burden of proof.  Id.  The child must articulate that he understands the power 
the court has in ordering a disposition.  Id.  Finally, the court must determine that 
the juvenile has made a decision based upon his guilt, freely admitted, without 
pressure or undue influence.  Id. 
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EXAMINATION 
BY [defense counsel]: DW, we talked this morning about 
trial and all the rights that go along with trial; is that 
right? 
A. Yes 
Q. Do you have any questions about those? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you 
give up your right to a trial and the rights that go along 
with it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That’s what you want to do? 
A. Yes. 
DW’s adjudications demonstrate just some of the ways that the 
actual practices in juvenile delinquency proceedings fail to meet 
the standards contemplated by Apprendi.  The unique nature of the 
juvenile court gives reason to question whether juveniles vigorously 
defend against adjudications as they would against criminal 
convictions.215  Children are not mature enough to consume the 
full meaning of so many important elements of the full juvenile 
justice process.  Typically, children have very little concern for their 
own future, essentially living only in the moment, especially those 
children who find themselves in juvenile court in the first place.  
They will have come to the attention of authorities precisely 
because they have poor impulse control, inadequate coping skills, 
and significant cognitive deficits.  They may also be poor, without 
family or shelter, and in critical need of supervision and services. 
The juvenile referral may be using the child’s “crime” as a device to 
find the money to provide the services or the authority to impose 
them. 
As noted in the introduction, the goal of juvenile court, the 
element which gives it its peculiar form and denies the child his 
right to a jury trial, is rehabilitation rather than punishment.  With 
this goal in mind, many of the professionals in the system, in which 
a defense lawyer may be absent, but parents, social workers, 
probation officers, and prosecutors appear, whether the state has 
met the burden of proof becomes subordinate to the child’s need 
for the panoply of services the system can offer after a finding of 
delinquency. 
 
 215. Fain, supra note 131, at 522. 
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As for the child making the decision, he knows that the court 
may only exercise jurisdiction until he turns eighteen.  Whether he 
pleads guilty to one charge or its lesser offense has very little 
immediate real consequence to him.  “When an adult chooses to 
plead delinquent to manslaughter instead of murder, he is likely 
making an informed choice between two distinct and determinate 
sentences.  In juvenile court, however, a juvenile who pleads 
delinquent may face an indeterminate sentence of commitment 
until age eighteen, regardless of the offense.”216 
Also, considering even a high-functioning child’s deference to 
parents and other authority figures, there exist not insignificant 
differences in bargaining power in plea negotiations for juveniles 
and adults.  The decision to plea may also be unduly influenced by 
parents who may want a quick resolution to avoid continuing a 
series of long days spent waiting for a few minutes of court time in 
which very little happens, and even less is understood.  The desire 
to bring the process to a quick close may overwhelm the ability to 
contemplate or realize the possible repercussions to a juvenile 
adjudication.217   
As noted, parental influence may have a negative impact on 
the juvenile.  Parents may have interests at odds with the child, 
sometimes hoping for a court order placing the child in treatment, 
or, expressing a desire to have the child “tell the truth” and face his 
consequences.218 
4. Due Process Hazards: The Pervasiveness of Poor Legal 
Representation 
In both of his cases, DW admitted to the petitions against him 
at his first opportunity.  His admissions moved him closer to his 
release from custody.  It is most unlikely that DW made his waivers 
with a thought to anything more than his release.  DW could have 
had very little opportunity to discuss his case with anyone.  
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the barriers of age, class, race, and 
education could have been surmounted to allow DW meaningful 
interaction with the professionals trying to help him.  These cases 
hardly represent the due process assurances or reliability 
 
 216. Id. at 521. 
 217. Id. at 521–22 (citations omitted). 
 218. Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 1477, 1502–03 (2009). 
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envisioned by the Supreme Court in Apprendi. 
According to Professor Wallace J. Mlyniec, the Lupo-Ricci 
Professor of Clinical Legal Studies and Director, Juvenile Justice 
Clinic at the Georgetown University law school, an investigation by 
the National Juvenile Defender Center219 revealed that one of the 
primary impediments to quality, effective representation in the 
juvenile court system was staggering caseloads.220  His report 
 
 219. According to its website,  
The National Juvenile Defender Center (NJDC) was created in 1999 to 
respond to the critical need to build the capacity of the juvenile defense 
bar and to improve access to counsel and quality of representation for 
children in the justice system.  In 2005, the National Juvenile Defender 
Center separated from the American Bar Association to become an 
independent organization.  NJDC gives juvenile defense attorneys a more 
permanent capacity to address practice issues, improve advocacy skills, 
build partnerships, exchange information, and participate in the 
national debate over juvenile crime.  NJDC provides support to public 
defenders, appointed counsel, law school clinical programs and non-
profit law centers to ensure quality representation in urban, suburban, 
rural and tribal areas.  NJDC offers a wide range of integrated services to 
juvenile defenders, including training, technical assistance, advocacy, 
networking, collaboration, capacity building and coordination.  
About Us, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDERS CTR., http://www.njdc.info/about_us.php 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 220. OHIO REPORT, supra note 167, at 11; ELIZABETH M. CALVIN ET AL., 
WASHINGTON: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
IN JUVENILE OFFENDER MATTERS 3 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info
/pdf/wareport.pdf; GABRIELLA CELESTE & PATRICIA PURITZ, THE CHILDREN LEFT 
BEHIND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN LOUISIANA 62–65 (Gabriella Celeste & Patricia Puritz 
eds., 2001), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/LAreport.pdf; CATHRYN 
CRAWFORD ET AL., ILLINOIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF 
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/illinois_assessment.pdf; ELIZABETH CUMMING ET AL., 
MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 3 (Elizabeth Cumming et al. eds., 2003), available at 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mdreport.pdf; LYNN GRINDALL ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 36 (Lynn Grindall et al. eds., 2003), available at 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ncreport.pdf; ELIZABETH GLADDEN KEHOE ET AL., 
INDIANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 9 (2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf
/Indiana%20Assessment.pdf; LAVAL S. MILLER-WILSON ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 3 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf
/pareport.pdf; PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 3 
(2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf; 
PATRICIA PURITZ & TAMMY SUN, GEORGIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 25–26 (Patricia Puritz et 
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indicated:  
Many of the states assessed had caseloads that were 
staggeringly high.  Staggering caseloads make it 
impossible for lawyers to perform even the most basic 
tasks associated with effective lawyering.  Clients were not 
consulted, investigations did not take place, motions were 
not filed, allegations were not contested, treatment plans 
were not developed, and unnecessary transfers to adult 
courts occurred.  Clients remained incarcerated for 
extended periods of time, services were not provided to 
clients, and clients never had viable defenses presented.  
Moreover, lawyers had no time to attend training 
programs in order to improve their skills.221   
Particularly discouraging are the recent observations by 
Professor Barbara Fedders, of the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill School of Law, regarding the “Nature and 
Pervasiveness of Substandard Legal Representation.”222  Fedders 
reports that Gault stimulated many institutions to promulgate 
practice guidelines for juvenile defenders.223  Despite the flurry of 
activity, time has shown that lawyers in juvenile court do not defend 
their clients with the vigor exercised by lawyers defending adults.224  
Studies conducted across the country reveal that these lawyers do 
not interview witnesses or visit crime scenes.225  They generally 
under-prepare their cases through general inaction, file few 
 
al. eds., 2001), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf; PATRICIA PURITZ 
ET AL., KENTUCKY: ADVANCING JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 5 (Patricia Puritz et al. 
eds., 2002) available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Kentucky_Assessment.pdf; 
PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., MISSISSIPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN YOUTH COURT PROCEEDINGS 8 (2007), available at 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mississippi_assessment.pdf; PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., 
VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 20–21 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2002), available at 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Virginia%20Assessment.pdf; CATHRYN E. STEWART ET 
AL., SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 4 (2000), available 
at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/TexasAssess.pdf; see also Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re 
Gault at 40: The Right for Counsel in Juvenile Court A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 
CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 402 (2008). 
 221. Mlyniec, supra note 220, at 402.  
 222. Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 791 
(2010). 
 223. See id. 
 224. See id. at 793. 
 225. Id. at 792.  
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pretrial motions, do not prepare for disposition hearings, and 
juvenile lawyers are untutored in the skills of trying a case to a 
judge rather than a jury.226  They do not consult with their clients,227 
they violate their duty of loyalty and confidentiality,228 and they 
misinform their clients, tending to believe that a disposition will 
lead to services and interventions that the client needs anyway.229 
Many juvenile defendants are victims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.230  This can result from factors such as poor 
investigation, infrequent use of motions, high caseloads, over-
reliance on pleas, a juvenile court culture of wanting to ‘help’ 
juveniles, and a general lack of training among attorneys on youth 
and adolescents.231 
5. Due Process Hazards: Little Post-Conviction Review 
At the time we began to defend DW, his right to review his 
juvenile adjudications had passed.  DW, like most juveniles, did not 
even know that he could have returned to juvenile court for relief, 
or sought review of his adjudications on appeal.  Collateral attack 
remained his only remedy.  Like many juveniles, DW had little 
understanding of his legal rights to relief.   
Although due process requires that a juvenile adjudicated 
delinquent have the same access to appeal as a criminal 
defendant in the jurisdiction, and every state grants a 
statutory right to appeal, far fewer juvenile cases are 
appealed than are adult cases.  Moreover, post-conviction 
relief is a statutory right, not a constitutional right, and 
not every state affords juveniles that right.232   
Especially where a juvenile’s punishment may only be 
community service, or a very brief stay at an out-of-home 
placement, there is little incentive to pursue post-adjudication 
remedies.233  Also, juveniles, already insecure and unsure about 
 
 226. Id. at 792–93.  
 227. See id. at 793 (stating that a larger number of attorneys for juveniles do 
not meet with their clients outside of court proceedings).   
 228. See id. at 794 (stating many times attorneys will have a confidential 
conversation in front of a juvenile client’s parents).   
 229. See id. 
 230. See, e.g., id. at 795 (reiterating that substandard lawyering negatively 
affects a youth’s case at both the adjudicatory and dispositional phases).  
 231. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 168, at 289. 
 232. Id. at 294. 
 233. See Donald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble: Implementing the 
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pursuing their right to trial counsel, are less aware and even less 
assertive in securing their right to appeal.234 
VI. CONCLUSION 
DW’s prosecution demonstrates the need to change Minnesota 
law.  The difference between a conviction for a misdemeanor and a 
felony is vast.  It is unfair to prosecute someone for a felony based 
upon juvenile adjudications from childhood.  Children just do not 
have the mental development necessary to make the legal decisions 
that have this important of an impact on their future.235  As a society 
we limit the decision-making power of children due to their 
immaturity.  It hardly seems reasonable to hold them to these 
choices.  
The juvenile court system is not designed to prompt children 
to fight adjudication.  As Justice Stewart observed in his dissent in 
Gault: 
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials.  They are not 
civil trials.  They are simply not adversary proceedings.  
Whether treating with a delinquent child, a neglected 
child, a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile 
proceeding’s whole purpose and mission is the very 
opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a 
criminal court.  The object of the one is correction of a 
condition.  The object of the other is conviction and 
punishment for a criminal act.236 
Next time the opportunity arises, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court should hold that juvenile adjudications not previously 
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt may not be used to 
enhance a criminal charge.  The legislature could also amend the 
statutes to allow enhancements only where there was a jury 
 
Right to Appeal from Adjudications of Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L. REV. 209, 
219–20 (1994). 
 234. See id. at 223 (“[C]hildren don’t always understand the consequences of 
court actions.”). 
 235.  See COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE? (2006); see also Terry A. 
Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 89, 95–103 (2009); Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper 
v. Simmons: “Kids are Just Different” and “Kids are Like Adults” Advocacy Strategies, 6 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 273 (2008) (arguing that neither the “kids are 
just different” nor the “kids are like adults” legal treatment is the best, but rather 
that both treatments should be used together). 
 236. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78–79 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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adjudication, which would mean EJJ cases.237 
In the end, the trial court never ruled on DW’s collateral 
attack.  The state offered DW a deal he could not refuse, and DW 
settled his case. 
 
 
 237. See Jennifer Park, Note, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A 
Legislative Solution for Unconstitutional Juvenile Waiver Policies, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
786, 810–12 (2008) (outlining a proposed model of potential legislation). 
50
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/2
